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Abstract
Nowadays, many cryptographic algorithms have been implemented for security 
purposes in communication systems. The problem of security has become an 
important issue in many applications, especially in multimedia applications. In this 
thesis, the security-related problems of particular multimedia applications are 
addressed and various cryptographic algorithms are then implemented in known or 
adapted procedures to solve such problems. The range of issues considered can be 
classified as follows:
Firstly, the problem of certifying the integrity of images from digital cameras such as for 
video surveillance is addressed and a scheme designed for this purpose is presented. 
Secondly, the problem of user authentication in one-way broadcast applications such as 
pay-TV service is indicated and a key distribution scheme based on the smart card and 
set top box combination technique is designed to solve such a problem. Thirdly, the 
problem of the right of privacy in communications between two parties is discussed 
and a scheme based on cascading algorithms is then used as a solution. Fourthly, the 
problem of encrypting a large amount of multimedia data such as a video stream is 
addressed and a low-complexity encryption method using block ciphers is designed to 
cope with this kind of data. Finally, the problem of secure distribution of copyright data 
is studied and two different approaches are then proposed. The first approach is based 
on the idea that the output from the watermarking scheme should be in encrypted 
form. The second approach is based on the idea of watermarking an encrypted copy.
All the proposed schemes have been published in some forms and therefore subjected 
to outside review of their security.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
Chapter 1 
Introduction
1.1. Background and Objectives
The advance of information technology has sparked off a public argument on the 
subject of individual privacy [Davies and Price, 1984]. Everyone is now aware of the 
real dangers of inaccurate personal information and uncontrolled access to files. Most 
developed countries have introduced laws to enforce a reasonable degree of individual 
data privacy and others have such laws in preparation. If privacy is considered as a 
legal concept, then data security is one of the means by which this privacy can be 
obtained. The implementation of these new laws is likely to require various 
techniques for data security purposes.
In the computer-based information area [Fluckiger, 1995], multimedia is defined as 
the field concerned with the computer-controlled integration of text, graphics, still and 
moving image, animation, sound and any other medium where every type of 
information can be represented, stored, transmitted and processed digitally. From this 
concept, different types of information can be combined to form a specific type of 
application such as video conferencing, multimedia e-mail, etc. Furthermore, they can 
be used either simultaneously or within a particular sequence to allow best use of the 
technological ability of whatever devices are being used. This multimedia capability is 
now being used effectively in the communication of ideas between people, that is in 
multimedia communications [Sloane, 1996].
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When a large amount of information is processed, stored and transmitted, the need for 
data security is greater and more varied, for example, the secrecy of transmitted 
information, authentication of information, verifying the identity of people, preventing 
the theft of stored information and controlling access to data. Such varied data 
security problems also arise from more recent advances in information technology 
including many modem multimedia applications. Hence, the requirements for data 
security do not stay the same. They change as the technology changes.
Of the three main operations carried out in information systems, storage, processing 
and transmission, it is obvious that data transmission carries the greatest of security 
risks. Since it is impossible to make every communication link physically secure, the 
security measures will mainly depend on information processing techniques such as 
cryptography. The security of stored data can be protected by using such a technique 
too. Therefore, the data security of multimedia communications can be achieved by 
the use of cryptography.
The main objective of this thesis is to develop efficient cryptographic techniques that 
resolve specific requirements of applications in communication systems including 
authentication, integrity as well as privacy. Various cryptographic algorithms are also 
implemented in known or adapted procedures to solve the security problems of 
particular multimedia applications. A range of issues are studied and the solutions are 
proposed such as secure data distribution methods, right of privacy in communications 
and user authentication in one-way broadcast applications.
1.2. Security Assessment
Security is a complex characteristic and difficult to design or optimise. Designing a 
system for security means analysing an adversary problem where the designer and the 
opponents are each independently thinking out their strategies [Davies and Price, 
1984]. The existence of so many methods of attack makes the protection of an
2
Chapter 1 Introduction
information system difficult to achieve. Every kind of threat to a system should be 
considered, though it is very hard to identify the complete range of attacks. The 
motives and intentions of the attacks have to be guessed. For example, stolen 
information can be used for fraud, spying, commercial advantage and probably in 
many other ways.
Generally, the designers judge a system to be secure if they have not been able to 
devise a method of misusing it, which gives some advantage to the attacker. But they 
might just have failed to identify the nature of the enemy or missed out a method of 
attack. Therefore, a good security investigation should never be based on the 
designer’s concept of the system which he has thought about the security and 
convinced himself that every aspect has been covered. Probably, he has a good 
theoretical reason to believe that the security goals have been achieved. What is then 
required is ‘lateral thinking’ which questions his assumptions and finds different 
approaches. The designers may have concentrated their attention on some parts of 
their system and forgotten others. On the other hand, systems can be so complex that 
only those who implemented them can fully understand their details.
Many cryptographic algorithms have been made public and widely accepted ,to be 
secure, such as the DES algorithm and the RSA algorithm with 1024-bit key-size. 
However their security cannot be guaranteed forever because the rapid developments 
of information technology lead to new various efficient threats to the security system. 
For instance, the available speed of computer processing unit (CPU) nowadays makes 
any cryptographic algorithm with 56-bit key-size, such as DES, not strong enough for 
security purposes. The cryptographic algorithms which are used throughout the thesis 
are of specific types and are assumed to be secure against all possible known attacks, 
at least at the time of writing the thesis. If these algorithms are broken, it is assumed 
that others will exist that can be substituted. A method of assessing the security of the 
work, which applies cryptographic algorithms in this thesis is as follows. Firstly, all 
possible attacks to the designed systems are carefully investigated. Then, the systems 
are discussed with the supervisor to find any practical weakness. Finally, they are 
submitted for reviewing process by experts in cryptography and related fields. After 
this step, they are believed to be secure at least to a certain level.
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One important thing which should be remembered is that no data system can be made 
secure without physical protection of some part of the equipment. Since processing of 
data always requires this data to be in clear form, the processors themselves must be 
protected from intrusion. In many systems, a considerable degree of security can be 
obtained in one box of modest size, physically strong and designed to destroy its 
stored secrets when it is opened [Davies and Price, 1984]. This is called a tamper- 
resistant module and the need for it sometimes cannot be avoided in security systems.
1.3. Thesis Outline
Firstly, in this chapter, a background to the need for data security in multimedia 
communications is highlighted and the objectives of the work are defined. Then, the 
methodology used for assessing the general and proposed security systems is 
described. Finally, the original achievements are summarised.
In chapter 2, the background of cryptography is introduced. The basic notations in 
cryptography are clarified, for instance, digital signature, hash function and strength of 
ciphers. Important features such as the general requirements of a cryptographic system 
are mentioned. Various cryptographic algorithms and techniques are described and some 
cautions are raised when applying block ciphers to sensitive data. Since the rest of the 
thesis focuses on implementations of cryptography, it is important for the readers to 
understand the contents in this chapter, at least their concepts. The following three 
chapters discuss different issues of varied data security problems. Each of them can be 
continued directly from chapter 2.
Chapter 3 is divided into three main sections. Each section corresponds to particular 
problems in multimedia applications and is independent of the others. The first section 
concentrates on the problem of certifying the integrity of images from digital cameras 
such as video surveillance. Since this information can be regarded as evidence for legal 
purposes, it is vital to assure that manipulations of images cannot occur. A scheme
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designed for this purpose is presented. The scheme implements cryptographic 
techniques such as digital signature and time-stamping to authenticate the sequence of 
images. The operations of the scheme are described and all possible attacks are 
discussed. The next section focuses on the problem of user authentication in one-way 
broadcast applications such as pay-TV service. A weakness of using the smart card and 
set top box combination technique to authenticate the subscribers of the service is 
indicated. A key distribution scheme based on Chinese Reminder Theory (CRT) is 
therefore designed to solve such a problem, that is, user authentication. The final 
section discusses the problem of the right of privacy in communications between two 
parties. A situation in which the attacker can require the parties to reveal the 
decryption key is considered, for example the police force someone to reveal his 
secret key for the encrypted data stored in his personal computer, and the technique of 
hiding ciphertext is then used as a solution. Different approaches for this kind of 
problem are reviewed. An encryption scheme based on cascading algorithms is 
introduced for hiding ciphertext in such a situation. The details of the scheme are 
described including its operation. At the end of the chapter, a set of comments and 
conclusions of the three main sections above are given.
In chapter 4, the problem of encrypting large amounts of multimedia data such as 
video streams is considered. Obviously, the main difference between ordinary data 
and multimedia data is the data size because multimedia data is usually much larger, 
compared to ordinary data such as text. This results in increasing complexity in the 
encrypting process, especially with public key algorithms. In this chapter, a low- 
complexity encryption method using block ciphers is designed to cope with this kind 
of data. A discrete linear transformation such as the Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) 
is implemented in the encryption scheme to reduce the amount of work needed to be 
done in the encrypting process. The details of the scheme and its performance are 
described and then the chapter is concluded with a set of summarising remarks.
In chapter 5, a security-related problem is first introduced, namely copyright protection. 
Digital watermarking techniques are used as one of various methods for copyright 
protection. However, watermark techniques alone cannot address other security 
problems such as secure distribution to the end users. In this situation, cryptography is
5
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co-operated with the watermarking technique. This chapter focuses on the problem of 
secure distribution of copyright data. Two different approaches are considered and 
discussed. The first approach is based on the idea that the output from the 
watermarking scheme should be in encrypted form. A scheme in which a public key 
algorithm may be implemented is introduced. The second approach is based on the 
idea of watermarking encrypted copy. The experimental results of the watermarked 
encrypted images are shown. A scheme which applies this technique is also 
introduced. The comments and summaries of the two approaches are finally given. 
The thesis ends with a conclusion chapter which looks back on the contributions made 
in this thesis and the possible directions for future research in this topic are presented 
at the end. A list of publications that were achieved in the course of the research work 
is shown as appendix A.
1.4. Original Work
The original work in this thesis can be summarised as follows:
• Data Integrity: Development of a method for protecting the integrity of a sequence 
of images from digital cameras.
• User Authentication: Development of key distribution scheme for the access 
control purpose in one-way broadcast service using smart card controlled set top 
boxes.
• Privacy: Development of a method for hiding ciphertext based on cascading 
algorithms technique.
• Secrecy: Development of a low-complexity encryption method using block ciphers.
• Copyright Data Distribution: Development of two methods for secure distribution 
of copyright data based on the idea that the output from a watermarking scheme 
should be in encrypted form, and based on the technique of watermarking 
encrypted video.
6
Chapter 2 Introduction to Cryptography
Chapter 2 
Introduction to Cryptography
2.1. Introduction
The previous chapter stated the need for data security in multimedia communications. In 
this chapter, cryptography is introduced as a tool to provide data security in 
communication systems. Various cryptographic algorithms such as public key 
algorithms are presented and used to resolve some security-related problems, for 
example, user authentication and data integrity. Since cryptography is applied to 
multimedia data such as images, a new kind of weakness can occur if it is used 
improperly. Such a weakness is shown in this chapter, and some useful advice is then 
suggested.
2.2. Terminology
In cryptographic terminology [Schneier, 1996], a message is plaintext (sometimes 
called cleartext). Encoding the contents of the message in such a way that hides its 
contents is called encryption. An encrypted message is ciphertext. The process of 
retrieving (or decoding) the plaintext from the ciphertext is called decryption. 
Encryption and decryption usually make use of a key, and the coding method is such
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that decryption can be performed only by knowing the proper key. This is all shown in 
Figure 2.1.
Encryption + Key
--------------------------- ►
Plaintext Ciphertext
<---------------------------
Decryption + Key
Figure 2.1 Encryption and Decryption
Cryptography is the art or science of keeping messages secret. Cryptanalysis is the art 
of breaking ciphertext, i.e. retrieving the plaintext without knowing the proper key. 
People who do cryptography are cryptographers, and practitioners of cryptanalysis are 
cryptanalysts. Cryptography deals with all aspects of secure messaging, 
authentication, digital signatures and other applications. Cryptology is the branch of 
mathematics that studies the mathematical foundations of cryptographic methods.
2.3. Basic Cryptographic Algorithms
A cryptographic algorithm of encryption and decryption is called a cipher. Some 
cryptographic algorithms rely on the secrecy of the algorithms but such algorithms are 
not adequate for the real-world needs. The following are some reasons that support the 
above idea:
• The users will never know whether the algorithms they are using are really secure 
against all possible attacks.
• The security of the whole cryptographic system should rely on a secret key so that 
when the system is compromised the users need to change the secret key only, not 
the whole system such as encryption/decryption devices.
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All modem algorithms use a key to control encryption and decryption, that is, a 
message can be decrypted only if the key matches the encryption key. The key used 
for decryption can be different from the encryption key, but for most algorithms they 
are the same. A cryptosystem is a cryptographic algorithm, plus all possible plaintexts, 
ciphertexts and keys.
There are two classes of key-based algorithms, symmetric (or secret-key) and 
asymmetric (or public key) algorithms [Simmons, 1979]. The difference is that 
symmetric algorithms use the same key for encryption and decryption, whereas 
asymmetric algorithms use a different key for encryption and decryption, and the 
decryption key can only with difficulty be derived from the encryption key.
Symmetric algorithms, sometimes called conventional algorithms, can be divided into 
stream ciphers and block ciphers. Stream ciphers encrypt a single bit of plaintext at a 
time, whereas block ciphers take a number of bits (typically 64 bits in modem 
ciphers), and encrypt them as a single unit. Asymmetric algorithms (also called public 
key algorithms) permit the encryption key to be public, allowing anyone to encrypt 
with the key, whereas only the proper recipient (who knows the decryption key) can 
decrypt the message. The encryption key is also called the public key and the 
decryption key the private key or secret key.
Modem cryptographic algorithms are designed to be executed by computers or 
specialised hardware devices. Generally, symmetric algorithms are much faster to 
execute than asymmetric ones largely because the operations have straight-forward 
hardware implementations. In practice they are often used together, so that a public 
key algorithm is used to encrypt a randomly generated encryption key, and the random 
key is used to encrypt the actual message using a symmetric algorithm. This is 
sometimes called a hybrid cryptosystem. The Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) software 
package is an example of a hybrid cryptosystem, which is now widely used.
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2.4. General Requirements of Cryptosystem
All cryptosystems must satisfy three general requirements to be acceptable for general 
use in communication systems [Denning, 1982]:
1. The encryption and decryption algorithms must be efficient for all keys.
2. The system must be easy to use.
3. The security of the system should depend only on the secrecy of the keys and not 
on the secrecy of the encryption or decryption algorithms.
Requirement (1) is essential for computer applications since data is usually encrypted 
and decrypted at the time of transmission, and those operations must not be 
bottlenecks. Requirement (2) implies it must be easy for the cryptographer to find a 
key with an invertible transformation. Requirement (3) implies the encryption and 
decryption algorithms must be inherently strong, that is, it should not be possible to 
break a cipher simply by knowing the method of encryption.
There are specific requirements for secrecy and authenticity. Secrecy requires that a 
cryptanalyst should not be able to determine plaintext data from intercepted 
ciphertext. Formally, there are two requirements:
1. It should be computationally infeasible for a cryptanalyst to systematically 
determine the decryption key from intercepted ciphertext, even if the 
corresponding plaintext is known.
2. It should be computationally infeasible for a cryptanalyst to systematically 
determine the plaintext from intercepted ciphertext.
Requirement (1) ensures that a cryptanalyst cannot systematically determine the 
decryption key (guessing may be possible). Thus, the cryptanalyst will not be able to 
decrypt the plaintext or other plaintext encrypted using the same encryption key. 
Requirement (2) ensures that a cryptanalyst cannot systematically determine the
10
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plaintext without the decryption key. Both requirements should hold regardless of the 
length or number of ciphertext messages intercepted.
Data authenticity requires that a cryptanalyst should not be able to substitute a false 
ciphertext for a genuine one without detection. Formally, the two requirements are:
1. It should be computationally infeasible for a cryptanalyst to systematically 
determine the encryption key for a given ciphertext, even if the corresponding 
plaintext is known.
2. It should be computationally infeasible for a cryptanalyst to systematically find 
any ciphertext such that the decrypted ciphertext is a valid plaintext message.
Requirement (1) ensures that a cryptanalyst cannot systematically determine the 
encryption key. Thus, the cryptanalyst will not be able to encrypt a different plaintext, 
and substitute the false ciphertext for the genuine one. Requirement (2) ensures that a 
cryptanalyst cannot find any ciphertext that decrypts into meaningful plaintext without 
the encryption key. Numerical data is particularly vulnerable to ciphertext substitution 
because all values may be meaningful. Both requirements should hold regardless of 
the amount of ciphertext intercepted.
There are two important points from the above paragraphs which should be clarified. 
First, the word ‘systematically’ is used to allow for the .possibility of a lucky guess. 
Although one successful guess may lead to one instance of a breakdown of security of 
authenticity, it should not be possible to do this repeatedly. Second, the term 
‘computationally infeasible’ is a mathematical concept grounded in the theory of 
computing and in number theory. In practice, this means that mathematicians consider 
that very great effort, perhaps thousands of years of supercomputer time, would be 
needed to crack the coding.
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2.5. Strength of Ciphers and Cryptanalysis
When a cryptanalyst attacks a cipher, first he needs to consider its strength. Since 
different ciphers offer different degrees of security, the strength depends on how hard 
they are to break. Generally, the strength of a cipher can be measured in terms of work 
function [Fites and Kratz, 1993]. This function typically yields the number of 
operations necessary to decrypt the ciphertext. For example, in an encryption 
algorithm using 64-bit key length, there are 264 possible keys. One measure of the 
strength is the number of operation necessary to generate half the possible keys (on the 
average, half of all possible keys would have to be tried before success). This measure 
assumes that the exhaustive search (try to decrypt the ciphertext with every possible 
key) is chosen. However, to break a cipher, the time needed to perform the attack 
{work factor) depends not only on the work function, but also on the method chosen to 
attack the cipher.
The methods of attacking a cipher fall into two categories, that is, cryptanalysis and 
brute force (or exhaustive search) methods. In theory, any cipher with a key can be 
broken by trying all possible keys in sequence. If using brute force to try all keys is the 
only option, the required computing power increases exponentially with the length of 
the key [Meyer and Matyas, 1982]. Another method, cryptanalysis, is sometimes more 
efficient than brute force method. Usually, there are four general types of cryptanalytic 
attacks and each of them assumes that the cryptanalyst has complete knowledge of the 
encryption algorithm used [Schneier, 1996].
1. Ciphertext-only Attack. The cryptanalyst has the ciphertext of several messages, 
all of which have been encrypted using the same encryption algorithm and key.
2. Known-plaintext Attack. The cryptanalyst has access not only to the ciphertext of 
several messages, but also to the plaintext of those messages.
3. Chosen-plaintext Attack. The cryptanalyst not only has access to the ciphertext and 
associated plaintext for several messages, but he also chooses the plaintext that 
gets encrypted.
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4. Chosen-ciphertext Attack. The cryptanalyst can choose different ciphertext to be 
decrypted and has access to the decrypted plaintext.
There are some other types of cryptanalytic attack mentioned in [Schneier, 1996], for 
example, adaptive-chosen-plaintext attack and chosen-key attack.
2.6. Stream Ciphers
A stream cipher employs a bit-stream generator to produce a stream of binary digits 
called a cryptographic bit-stream [Meyer and Matyas, 1982], which is then combined 
either with plaintext (via Exclusive-OR operation XOR or modulo 2 addition) to 
produce ciphertext, or with ciphertext to recover plaintext.
If the bit-stream generator were truly random, an unbreakable cipher could be 
obtained by XORing the plaintext and cryptographic bit-stream. In that case, the 
cryptographic bit-stream is used directly as the key and is equal in length to the 
message. However, it is not convenient to the users in advance to transmit a very large 
cryptographic bit-stream via some independent and secure channel. Hence, for 
practical reasons, the bit-stream generator must be implemented as an algorithmic 
procedure, so that the cryptographic bit-stream can be produced by both users. In such 
an approach, the bit-stream generator is a key-controlled algorithm and must produce 
a bit-stream which is cryptographically strong.
In a stream cipher, the algorithm may generate its bit-stream on a bit-by-bit basis, or in 
blocks of bits. Therefore, it is always possible for a block cipher to be used to obtain a 
stream cipher. However, in a communications system, because both the sender and 
receiver must produce cryptographic bit-streams that are equal and secret, their keys 
must also be equal and secret. In effect, this means that a public key algorithm can be 
used to obtain a stream cipher only if it is used as a conventional algorithm i.e. with 
the encryption key secret.
13
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Since the key is a constant quantity, it follows that the cryptographic bit-stream, or 
block of bits produced at each iteration of the algorithm, will not change if it depends 
only on the key. In this case, once the cryptanalyst has obtained the cryptographic bit­
stream, he can decrypt any intercepted ciphertext without ever knowing the key. This 
is, of course, unacceptable.
The stream cipher must not start from the same initial conditions in a predictable way, 
and thereby regenerate the same cryptographic bit-stream at each iteration of the 
algorithm. Since the key, even though it is secret, does not ensure an unpredictable 
cryptographic bit-stream, another quantity, defined as the initialising vector IV, must 
be introduced into the encryption process. (Another term used is seed.) In effect, 
different initialising vectors cause different cryptographic bit-streams to be generated. 
The cryptographic bit-stream is unpredictable as long as the initialising vector satisfies 
one of the following conditions [Meyer andMatyas, 1982].
1. Random. IV is produced by some natural phenomenon whose statistics have been 
demonstrated to be random, and IV has enough combinations so that the 
probability of their repeating is extremely small.
2. Pseudo-random. IV is produced by a deterministic process whose period (the 
interval between equal recurring values) is extremely large compared to the length 
of IV, and whose values have the statistical properties of randomness.
3. Non-repeating. Under certain conditions, IV can be produced by a process that 
may be predictable, but whose period before repeating is so large that for practical 
purposes it is of no concern. A 64-bit IV would satisfy this condition. Although 
this is really an extreme case of condition 2, it may be considered as a separate 
condition. Even if the cryptanalyst obtains the cryptographic bit-stream associated 
with one IV setting, he cannot determine what the bit-stream will be for a different 
IV setting.
In contrast to the key, which must be kept secret, the initialising vector may be a non­
secret quantity. This is because the initialising vector either does not repeat, or else 
repeats with only a small probability (determined by the length of the initialising 
vector). The basic scheme of a stream cipher is shown in Figure 2.2.
14
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Plaintext Ciphertext Plaintext
Bit-Stream
Generator
Bit-Stream
GeneratorKey
IV
Key
Figure 2.2 Basic Scheme o f Stream Cipher
2.7. Block Ciphers
A block cipher transforms a string of input bits of fixed length (an input block) into a 
string of output bits of fixed length (an output block). The encrypting and decrypting 
functions are ideally such that every bit in the output block depends jointly on every 
bit in the input block and on every bit in the key. A cipher’s block size (the number of 
bits in a block) must be large enough to prevent simple message exhaustion attacks. 
For example, by encrypting all possible plaintext combinations with a given key, a 
cryptanalyst could build a dictionary of ciphertext (sorted into sequence) and 
corresponding plaintext. A message could then be recovered by searching the 
dictionary and relating each intercepted ciphertext block to its corresponding plaintext 
block. However, if the block size is large enough, the dictionary will be too large to 
construct or store.
Since block ciphers are used in the work throughout the thesis, the algorithms behind 
those which are chosen should be studied. In conventional algorithms, the Data 
Encryption Standard (DES) algorithm is chosen to be an example as it has been a 
world-wide standard for 20 years [ANSI X.3.92, 1981]. Although many people think 
that DES, in these days, is not strong enough, it has held up remarkably well against 
years of cryptanalysis and its function is still worth studying. However, the principle 
of DES is described only, not fine details. (Other conventional algorithms such as 
SAFER, IDEA also use the same principle as DES). For public key algorithms, Diffie-
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Heilman key agreement and the RSA algorithm (named for the algorithm’s inventors: 
Rivest, Shamir and Adleman) are chosen to be examples as they are the most well- 
known public key algorithms which have been widely accepted to be secure (with 
large enough key size).
2.7.1. Data Encryption Standard (DES)
DES is an algorithm developed in the 1970s. It was made a standard by the US 
government, and has also been adopted by several other governments world-wide. 
DES is a symmetrical key-based cipher, which encrypts data in 64-bit blocks. The 
length of key is 56 bits. However, the key is usually shown as 64-bit in which every 
eighth bit of each byte is used for parity checking and is ignored. (These parity bits are 
the least-significant bits of the key byte.) The key can be any character or number and 
can be changed at any time. The algorithm of DES is a combination of the two basic 
techniques of encryption: confusion and diffusion (see Figure 2.3). Confusion obscures 
the relationship between the plaintext and the ciphertext by using substitution. 
Diffusion dissipates the redundancy of the plaintext by spreading it out over the 
ciphertext. A simple way to cause diffusion is through transposition (sometimes 
called permutation).
c r y p t o g r a p h y
i l i l i l i l l l ! !  substitution 
d s z q u p h s b q i  z
transposition
c r  y p t  o g r  a p h y
Figure 2.3 Substitution and Transposition
Permutations in the DES are of three kinds: straight permutations, expansion 
permutation and compression permutation. In a straight permutation (also called P- 
box permutation), bits are simply reordered. In the expansion permutation, some bits 
are duplicated and the whole resulting field reordered. In compression permutation,
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some bits are ignored and the remainder reordered. Substitutions in the DES are 
known as S-boxes and are specified by eight different tables. The S-boxes have 6-bit 
inputs and 4-bit outputs.
The fundamental building block of DES is a single combination of these techniques (a 
substitution followed by a permutation) on the text, based on the key. This is known 
as a round. DES has 16 rounds, that is, it applies the same combination of techniques 
on the plaintext block 16 times.
Ciphertext
Plaintext
Rl6 = L l5 ® f  (Rl5,Kl6)
R2 = LI @ f ( R 1,K2)
R,  = Lo® f ( R 0,K1)
Ris =  L i5 © /  (Rl4,Kjs)
Figure 2.4 Operations o f DES
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From the Figure 2.4, the DES operates on a 64-bit block of plaintext. After an initial 
permutation IP (a straight permutation), the block is broken into a right half and a left 
half, each 32 bits long. Then there are 16 rounds of identical operations, using 
function f  in which the data is combined with the key. After the sixteenth round, the 
right and left halves are joined, and then the algorithm finishes with a final 
permutation IP'1 (the inverse of the initial permutation).
In each round, the 56-bit key is divided into two 28-bit halves. Then, the halves are 
circularly shifted left by either one or two bits, depending on the round. After being 
shifted, 48 bits are selected from the 56 bits of the key. The right half of the data is 
expanded to 48 bits via an expansion permutation, combined with 48 bits of a shifted 
and permuted key via an XOR, sent through 8 S-boxes producing 32 new bits, and 
permuted again. These four operations make up function /. The output of function/is 
then combined with the left half via another XOR. The result of these operations 
becomes the new right half and the old right half becomes the new left half. These 
operations are repeated 16 times, making 16 rounds of DES. The operations in one 
round of DES are shown in Figure 2.5.
Key
Shift Shift
Expansion Permutation
Permutation
S-Box Substitution
P-Box Permutation
Key
Figure 2.5 One Round o f DES
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If Bi is the result of the zth iteration, Li and Ri are the left and right halves of Bu Ki is 
the 48-bit key for round i, and /  is the function that does all the substituting and 
permuting and XORing with the key, then a round can be described by:
Li = Ri-i
Ri = Li-j © /  (Ri-i, Ki)
The decryption algorithm of DES is efficient since it was designed in such a way that 
the same algorithm works for both encryption and decryption. Hence, it is possible to 
use the same function to encrypt or decrypt a block. The only difference is that the 
keys must be used in the reverse order. That is, if the encryption keys for each round 
are Ki, K2, K3..., Km , then the decryption keys are Kj6, K15, K14..., Kj. The algorithm 
that generates the key used for each round is circular as well.
2.7.2. Public Key Algorithms
As can be seen conventional cryptosystems have the requirement that, prior to the 
transmission of each message, the sender and receiver must have agreed upon the key 
to be used and that this key must remain secret. This requirement, of course, poses 
many problems in practice, for instance, key management in communication network. 
However, the problem can be eliminated by using a non-secret encryption technique 
proposed by Ellis in 1970, where a secure encrypted message can be decrypted by the 
authorised recipient without any prior secret exchange of the key [Ellis, 1970]. This 
technique was later known as public key cryptography and numerous public key 
cryptographic systems have been proposed since then. All of these systems rely on the 
difficulty of a mathematical problem for their security.
Before cryptographic systems and the corresponding mathematical problems are 
discussed, the difficulty of a problem must be defined. Normally, a mathematical 
problem is difficult if the fastest algorithm to solve the problem takes a long time 
relative to the input size [ECC Whitepaper, 1997]. To analyse how long an algorithm 
takes, computer scientists introduced the idea of polynomial time algorithms and
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exponential time algorithms. Basically, an algorithm runs quickly relative to the size 
of its input if it is a polynomial time algorithm, and slowly if it is an exponential time 
algorithm. Therefore, easy problems equate with polynomial time algorithms, and 
difficult problems equate with exponential time algorithms.
It is important to notice the word ‘relative to the input size’ in the above definition. 
All problems are straightforward to solve if the input size is very small, but we are 
interested in how much harder a problem gets as the size of the input grows. For 
example, adding 4 and 14 to get 18 is straightforward, as is factoring 21 as 3x7. 
However, addition is an example of an easy problem because there is an algorithm to 
add numbers which runs in polynomial time, meaning that it would not take very long 
to add two enormous numbers. On the other hand, factoring is a hard problem 
because, in general, factoring a large number takes a very long time. Therefore, when 
looking for a mathematical problem on which to base a public key cryptographic 
system, cryptographers are searching for a problem for which the fastest algorithm 
takes exponential time. In broad terms, the longer it takes to compute the best 
algorithm for a problem, the more secure a public key cryptosystem based on that 
problem will be.
Over the years, many of the proposed public key cryptographic systems have been 
broken and many others have proved impractical. Nowadays, there are three types of 
systems which are considered both secure and efficient: the discrete logarithm systems 
e.g. Diffie-Hellman key agreement, the integer factorisation systems e.g. the RSA 
algorithm and the elliptic curve cryptosystems (classified according to the 
mathematical problem on which they are based).
2.7.3. Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement
Diffie-Hellman key agreement was the first public key algorithm, published in 1976 
[Diffie and Heilman, 1976]. Its security relies on the difficulty of calculating discrete 
logarithms in a finite field, as compared with the ease of calculating exponentiation in 
the same field. This algorithm is purely to allow two parties to generate an agreed key
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over an insecure channel. It cannot be used to encrypt and decrypt messages. The 
principle of the algorithm is as follows:
In the network, two parties (Alice and Bob) want to set up an agreed key Sk-
1. Alice and Bob agree on a large prime number p, and g such that g is primitive mod 
p. These two numbers do not have to be secret and are used to calculate the agreed 
key over the insecure channel.
2. Alice chooses a random large number*, which is kept secret, and sends Bob
A  = g x mod p
3. Bob chooses a random large number y, which is also kept secret, and sends Alice
B = g y mod p
4. Alice calculates the agreed key
Sk - B x mod p = g yx mod p
5. Bob calculates the agreed key
Sk = A y mod p = g xy mod p
Note that the numbers p  and g act as a public key, while * and y act as the private key 
of Alice and Bob respectively. The reason for choosing p  as a prime number is that the 
complexity of calculating discrete logarithms in a finite field of a prime number is 
more difficult than in the general case. It is far more difficult to solve these problems 
if p  is a very large prime number, for example, 512-bit or 1024-bit.
Although someone sees Alice send Bob three numbers p, g and A, and sees Bob send 
Alice a number B, he cannot use these numbers to calculate 5^. Unless he can 
compute the discrete logarithm and recover * or y, he does not solve the problem. 
Thus, Sk is the agreed key that both Alice and Bob computed independently. 
However, the weakness of this algorithm can be exploited if someone puts himself 
between the parties on the communication line and pretends to be one of the parties. 
This is called man-in-the-middle attack which will be discussed later.
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2.7.4. RSA (Rivest, Shamir and Adleman System)
This is a well-known public key algorithm proposed in 1978 [Rivest et al, 1978]. Its 
security lies in the difficulty of the problem of factoring large integers, especially, the 
product of two large primes (100-200 digits or even larger). In the RSA algorithm, the 
public and private keys are functions of a pair of large prime numbers.
To generate a pair of keys, we first select two random large prime numbers p  and q 
(see a suggested method of finding a prime number in [Rivest et al, 1978]) and 
compute the product
n = p  q
For maximum security, select p  and q of equal length. We then randomly choose an 
encryption key e such that e and (p-l)(q-l) are relatively prime. For instance, choose a 
prime number e which is greater than (p-1) and (q-1). Finally, we use the extended 
Euclidean algorithm [Ore, 1948] to compute the decryption key d  such that
ed = lmod (p-l)(q-l)
In other words,
d = e '1 mod (p-l)(q-l)
Note that d and n are also relatively prime. The numbers e and n are the public key 
and the number d is the private key. The two primes, p  and q, are no longer needed. 
They should be discarded, but never revealed.
To encrypt a message m, it is first divided into successive numerical blocks m,- smaller 
that n (with binary data, choose the largest power of 2 less than n). The ciphertext q  
will be made up of similarly sized message block of about the same length. The 
encryption algorithm is as follows:
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Ci = m\e mod n
To decrypt a message, take each encrypted block cj and compute 
m\ = Ci d mod n
Since the encrypting and decrypting functions are mutual inverses, the RSA algorithm 
can be used for both secrecy and authenticity. That is, the message could be encrypted 
with d and decrypted with e.
2.7.5. Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems
Elliptic curves have been studied for many years and there is an enormous amount of 
literature on the subject. They were suggested for use in cryptography in 1985 
independently by [Koblitz, 1985] and [Miller, 1985]. Both authors did not invent a 
new cryptographic algorithm with elliptic curves over finite fields, but they 
implemented existing public key algorithms, like Diffie-Hellman key agreement, 
using elliptic curves. The idea is to replace operations in a group of integers modulo a 
prime with operations in a group of points of an elliptic curve over a finite field.
One advantage of using the elliptic curves is that the best known methods for solving 
the discrete log problem in an elliptic curve group are much slower than for the group 
of integers modulo a prime. In other words, operations in a group of points of an 
elliptic curve over a finite field provide higher strength-per-bit than operations in a 
group of integers modulo a prime in the same finite field. To give equivalent security 
to RSA with a 1024-bit modulus one needs to work over finite fields of size only ~ 
2160 [Waller, 1998]. This means that the elliptic curve cryptosystems have very low- 
computational complexity, compared to other public key algorithms such as the RSA 
algorithm. This thesis will not go into the details of elliptic curve cryptosystems. 
Those interested in this topic are invited to read the references previously mentioned.
23
Chapter 2 Introduction to Cryptography
2.8. Modes of Operation in Block Ciphers
In block ciphers, the size of a message is often larger than the operating block size. 
Therefore, the message is broken into successive blocks, typically of the same length. 
Ending blocks are padded to the same length. Each successive block is encrypted using 
the same key. At this step, a mode of operation is applied. A cryptographic mode usually 
combines the basic cipher, some sort of feedback and some simple operations. The 
simple operations can be used because the security is a function of the underlying cipher, 
not the mode. Moreover, the modes of operation should not compromise the security of 
the underlying algorithm.
Normally, there are four modes of operation [Schneier, 1996], which have been found to 
cover most of the practical requirements for the use of encryption in real world. They are 
commonly called by the initial letters of their names, that is, Electronic Code Book 
(ECB), Cipher Block Chaining (CBC), Cipher Feedback (CFB) and Output Feedback 
(OFB). Each mode has particular advantages in some circumstances, such as when 
transmitting a message over a noisy channel, or when it is necessary to decrypt only a 
portion of a file. A brief summary of these four modes is as follows:
2.8.1. Electronic Code Book (ECB) Mode
In ECB mode (see Figure 2.6), each block of plaintext is encrypted independently, a 
block at a time. This allows a portion of encrypted files to be accessed randomly, like 
a database. If a database is encrypted with ECB mode, then any record can be added, 
deleted, encrypted, or decrypted independently of any other record (assuming that a 
record consists of a discrete number of encryption blocks). One disadvantage is that 
this method may not indicate when portions of a message have been inserted or 
removed. If a bit-error occurs in any block of ciphertext, it will cause the entire 
plaintext block to decrypt incorrectly {error extension) but will not affect the rest of
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the plaintext. However, if a ciphertext bit is accidentally lost or added 
{synchronisation error), all subsequent ciphertext will decrypt incorrectly.
m-bit key
Block Cipher
n-bit block 
of plaintext
n-bit block 
of ciphertext
Figure 2.6 Electronic Code Book (ECB) 
Encryption: Q  = (Pi)
Decryption: Pi = (Q)
where Pi is a block of plaintext, Q  is a block of ciphertext
Ek is encryption with key K, DK is decryption with key K
2.8.2. Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) Mode
In CBC Mode (Figure 2.7), the plaintext is XORed with the previous ciphertext block 
before it is encrypted. After a plaintext block is encrypted, the resultant ciphertext 
block is then stored in a feedback register. Before the next plaintext block is 
encrypted, it is XORed with the feedback register to become the next input to the 
encrypting routine. The process carries on until the end of the message. Unlike ECB 
mode, long runs of repeated characters in the plaintext message will be concealed in 
the ciphertext message. At the beginning of encrypting process, a random value 
(referred to as the Initialising Vector in section 2.6) is generated and used as the first 
plaintext block. The IV should be different each time of encryption, but need not be 
secret. With different IVs, identical plaintext messages encrypt to different ciphertext 
messages. In CBC mode, a single-bit error in the ciphertext affects one full block of 
corresponding plaintext and a one-bit error in the same bit position of the subsequent 
plaintext block. A synchronisation error results in all subsequent ciphertext being 
decrypted incorrectly.
25
Chapter 2 Introduction to Cryptography
m-bit key
n-bit register B
n-bit register A
Block Cipher
n-bit block 
of plaintext
n-bit block 
of ciphertext
n-bit block of 
Initialising 
Vector (IV) for 
the first block
Figure 2.7 Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)
Encryption: Q = Ek (Pi ® Q_i)
Decryption: Pi = Cm © (Q)
2.8.3. Cipher Feedback (CFB) Mode
In CFB mode (Figure 2.8), data can be encrypted in units smaller than the block size. 
That is, it can encrypt the data at any block size, which is less than or equal to the 
operating block size n, at a time. For example, a plaintext is encrypted using 8 -bit 
CFB mode with a 64-bit block algorithm. Initially, the input shift register is filled with 
an IV, as in CBC mode. The shift register is encrypted and the left-most eight bits of 
the result are XORed with the first 8 -bit character of the plaintext to become the first 
8 -bit character of the ciphertext. These eight bits are moved to the right-most eight bit 
positions of the input shift register, and all the other bits move eight to the left. The 
eight left-most bits are discarded. Then the next plaintext character is encrypted in the 
same manner. Decryption is the reverse of this process. With CFB mode, the first 
effect of a single-bit error in the ciphertext is to cause a single error in the plaintext. 
After that, the error enters the shift register, where it causes ciphertext to be corrupted 
until it falls off the other end of the register. In 8 -bit CFB mode, 9 bytes of decrypted 
plaintext are corrupted by a single-bit error in the ciphertext. Then, the system
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recovers and all subsequent ciphertext is decrypted correctly. CFB is self-recovering 
with respect to synchronisation errors as well.
n-bit input
shift register A < ^
m-bit key — ► Block Cipher
f
n-bit output 
shift register B
e-J— ►
n-bit block of 
Initialising 
Vector (IV) for 
the first block
-> ciphertext
plaintext
Figure 2.8 Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB) 
Encryption: Q = Pi © E^ (Q.i) 
Decryption: Pi = Q  © E^ (Q_i)
2.8.4. Output Feedback (OFB) Mode
OFB mode (Figure 2.9) is a method of running a block cipher as synchronous stream 
cipher, that is, the bit-stream is generated independently of the message stream. It is 
similar to CFB mode, except that 8 -bits of the previous output block (referred to the 
example given in CFB mode) are moved into the right-most positions of the input 
shift register. Decryption is the reverse of this process. Since the feedback mechanism 
is independent of both the plaintext and the ciphertext stream, this is sometimes called 
internal feedback. OFB mode has no error extension. A single-bit error in the 
ciphertext causes a single-bit error in the recovered plaintext. This can be useful in 
some applications, where the occasional single-bit error can be tolerated but error 
extension cannot. On the other hand, a loss of synchronisation is destructive. If the 
shift registers at the encryption end and the decryption end are not identical in content, 
then the recovered plaintext will be corrupted.
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ciphertext
plaintext
m-bit key Block Cipher
n-bit input 
shift register A
n-bit output 
shift register B
n-bit block of 
Initialising 
Vector (IV) for 
the first block
>0
Figure 2.9 Output Feedback Mode (OFB) 
Encryption: Q = Pi © Si, Si = Ek (Q-i) 
Decryption: Pi = Q  © Si, Si = E^ (Q_i)
where Si is the state in the input/out shift registers, which is independent of 
either the plaintext or the ciphertext
2.9. Digital Signatures
A digital signature is a property private to a user or process that is used for signing a 
message [Denning, 1982]. Ordinarily, a digital signature provides two different 
functions in cryptography: integrity and authentication. In some contexts, it is claimed 
to serve another function, that is, non-repudiation. Some public key algorithms can 
provide a simple scheme for implementing digital signatures. That is, a digital 
signature is a block of data that was created using a private key, and can be verified 
using the corresponding public key. The algorithm used to generate the signature must 
be such that, without knowing the private key, it is not possible to create a signature 
that would verify as valid.
Digital signatures are used to verify that a message truly comes from the claimed 
sender (assuming only the sender knows the secret key corresponding to his public 
key). They can also be used to timestamp documents, that is, a trusted party signs the
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document and its timestamp with his secret key, thus testifying that the document 
existed at the stated time. Digital signatures can also be used to testify (or certify) that 
a public key belongs to a particular person. This is done by signing the combination of 
the key and the information about its owner by a key of trusted party such as 
government agencies or certification authorities.
A digital signature of an arbitrary document is typically created by computing a 
message digest (also known as a cryptographic checksum or cryptographic hash value) 
from the document, and concatenating it with information about the signer, a 
timestamp, etc. The resulting string is then encrypted using the private key of the 
signer using a suitable algorithm. The resulting encrypted block of bits is the 
signature. It is often distributed together with information and the corresponding 
public key. To verify a signature, the recipient first determines whether it trusts that 
the key belongs to the person it is supposed to belong to (using a priori knowledge or 
checking from the trusted parties such as certification authorities), and then decrypts 
the signature using the public key of the person. If the signature decrypts properly and 
the information matches that of the message (proper message digest etc.), the 
signature is accepted as valid.
2.9.1. Cryptographic Hash Functions
Cryptographic hash functions are typically used to compute the message digest when 
making a digital signature. A hash function compresses the bits of a message to a 
fixed-size hash value in a way that distributes the possible messages evenly among the 
possible hash values. A cryptographic hash function does this in a way that makes it 
extremely difficult to come up with a message that would hash to a particular value 
(referred to as one-way hash function). The cryptographic hash function is public and 
there is no secret to the process. The security of the hash function is its one-wayness. 
The output is independent of the input in any observable way. If a single bit changes 
in the message, it leads to a change, on the average, of half of the bits in the hash 
value. Cryptographic hash functions typically produce hash values of 128 or more bits. 
The well-known one is MD5 (Message Digest Algorithm 5) designed by Ron Rivest
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[Rivest, 1992]. It can be used to hash an arbitrary length byte string into a 128-bit 
value. MD5 is in wide use, and is considered reasonably secure.
2.10. Cryptographic Protocols
A protocol is a series of steps, involving two or more parties, designed to accomplish a 
task [Schneier, 1996]. This is a vital definition and should be clarified. Firstly, “series of 
steps” means that the protocol has a sequence, from start to finish. Every step must be 
executed in turn, and no step can be taken before the previous step is finished. Secondly, 
“Involving two or more parties” means that at least two people are required to complete 
the protocol. One person alone does not make a protocol. Finally, “designed to 
accomplish” means that the protocol must achieve something.
A cryptographic protocol is a protocol that uses cryptography. The parties can be friends 
and trust each other implicitly or they can be enemies and not trust one another at all. A 
cryptographic protocol involves some cryptographic algorithm, but generally the goal of 
the protocol is something beyond a simple secret. The parties participating in the 
protocol might want to share parts of their secrets to compute a value, jointly generate a 
random sequence, convince one another of their identities, or simultaneously sign a 
contract. The vital point of using cryptography in a protocol is to prevent or detect 
eavesdropping and cheating. A good example of a cryptographic protocol is a key- 
exchange protocol incorporating Diffie-Hellman key agreement (as shown in section
2.7.2.).
The work in this thesis mainly involves designing a cryptographic protocol to overcome 
some particular problems, for example, a protocol for verifying a sequence of images. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter the cryptographic algorithms used throughout the 
thesis are assumed to be secure. The important work needing to be done is to examine 
all possible attacks against the proposed protocols.
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2.10.1. Attacks against Protocols
Cryptographic attacks against the protocols themselves can be divided into two 
categories, that is, passive and active attacks. In passive attacks, the attacker (or 
cryptanalyst) does not affect the protocol. All he can do is observe the protocol and 
attempt to gain information. This kind of attack corresponds to a ciphertext-only 
attack. Since passive attacks are difficult to detect, protocols try to prevent passive 
attacks rather than detect them. Usually, the passive attackers try to get information 
about the parties involved in the protocol. They collect messages passing among 
various parties and attempt to cryptanalyse them.
Alternatively, in active attacks, an attacker could try to alter the protocol to his own 
advantage. He could pretend to be someone else, introduce new messages in the 
protocol, delete existing messages, substitute one message for another, replay old 
messages, interrupt a communications channel, alter stored information, degrade 
system performance, or gain unauthorised access to resources. Sometimes, active 
attacks are much more serious, especially in protocols in which the different parties do 
not necessarily trust one another. The attacker does not have to be a complete outsider. 
He could be a legitimate system user. He could be the system administrator. There 
could even be many active attackers working together.
It is possible that the attacker could be one of the parties involved in the protocol. He 
may lie during the protocol or not follow the protocol at all. This type of attacker is 
called a cheater. Passive cheaters follow the protocol, but try to obtain more 
information than the protocol intends them to. Active cheaters disrupt the protocol in 
progress in an attempt to cheat.
Considering a situation where two parties are exchanging keys for secure 
communications using Diffie-Hellman key agreement, a passive attack would not 
work unless the attacker can solve the discrete logarithm problem in a finite field. In 
contrast, an active attack is very efficient. An attacker puts himself between the parties 
on the communication line. He then performs a separate key exchange with each 
party. The parties will end up using a different key, each of which is known to the
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attacker. The attacker will then decrypt any communications with the proper key, and 
encrypt them with the other key for sending to the other party. This is commonly 
called the man-in-the-middle attack. However, there are some ways for the parties to 
verify that they are talking to each other. For example, using a simple authenticated 
key agreement algorithm proposed by [Seo and Sweeney, 1999], the modified Diffie- 
Hellman key agreement used in a protocol can provide the user authentication.
2.11. A Weakness of Block Ciphers
This kind of weakness was first introduced by the researchers at the Communications 
Research Centre, Lancaster University [Samarakoon et al, 1997]. That is, if block 
ciphers are used improperly, the ciphertext may leak some useful information to the 
attackers. Since block ciphers can be considered as one-to-one mapping between 
blocks of plaintext and ciphertext, depending on the key, encryption of repeated 
blocks of plaintext results in the same ciphertext blocks. This is a weakness of block 
ciphers. It can be more serious, when they are applied to multimedia data. To illustrate 
the weakness, a simple image "Test' was created and then encrypted by the block 
cipher DES in ECB mode. (The word ‘simple’ here refers to repetition of the same 
value of pixels.) Figure 2.10 shows the result of the encryption.
Test
(a) (b)
Figure 2.10 Encryption o f Image ‘Test’ using DES in ECB mode, 
a) Original Image b) Encrypted Image
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It can be seen that the contents in the image are not entirely hidden and anyone would 
be able to learn what is contained inside the image. This is, of course, unacceptable. 
However, this kind of weakness can be easily avoided by changing the bit patterns of 
input in such a way that there is no repetition of same value input blocks. To prove 
this technique, an image ‘Lena’ in which the pixels have various values was chosen to 
be encrypted and the result is shown in Figure 2.11.
(a) (b)
Figure 2.11 Encryption o f  Image ‘Lena’ using DES in ECB mode, 
a) Original Image b) Encrypted Image
This time, the contents in the image are totally hidden. Therefore, when encrypting data 
with block ciphers, some precautions must be taken. For instance, the characteristics of 
input plaintext blocks should be made random. Usually, there are two methods used to 
avoid repetition of the input plaintext block. The first method can be done by encrypting 
the data in the proper operation modes, for example in CBC mode, so that the input 
plaintext block will be varied by the feedback mechanism. That is, the input plaintext 
block depends on the previous output ciphertext block. Figure 2.12 shows the encryption 
of the ‘Test’ image in different modes.
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ggtgg
Figure 2.12 Encryption o f Image ‘Test' using DES in Different modes 
a) Original Image b) Encrypted Image by CBC mode
c) Encrypted Image by 64-bit CFB mode
d) Encrypted Image by 64-bit OFB mode
The second approach is to compress the data before encryption so that redundancies in 
the data will be minimised. Another advantage of this method is that it reduces the 
amount of work needed to be done in the encryption process and also reduces the 
transmission bandwidth.
34
Chapter 2 Introduction to Cryptography
2.12. Conclusions
In this chapter, the basic features of various cryptographic algorithms have been studied. 
They can be used together to provide three main services for data security purposes, 
namely, secrecy, authenticity and integrity. Secrecy refers to denial of access to 
information by unauthorised individuals. Authenticity refers to validating the source 
of a message, that is, it is transmitted by a properly identified sender. Integrity refers 
to assurance that a message is not modified accidentally or intensively in transit, by 
replacement, insertion or deletion. Note that, in some texts, a fourth service which 
may be provided is non-repudiation of origin, that is, protection against a sender of a 
message later denying transmission.
The cryptographic protocol was then introduced as an important part of a security 
system. Various attacks against either cryptographic algorithms or a protocol itself 
were classified and described. A weakness of block ciphers when applied to 
multimedia data was illustrated. Advice was also given on how to avoid this kind of 
weakness, namely that the modes of operation in block ciphers should be carefully 
chosen and compression techniques should be applied to the data before the 
encryption process. In the next three chapters, cryptographic algorithms will be used 
in various applications to resolve some particular security problems in multimedia 
communications.
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Chapter 3 
Implementations of Cryptography
3.1. Introduction
As already mentioned in the previous chapter, cryptography can provide three main 
services for data security purpose in communication systems i.e. integrity, authenticity 
and secrecy. This chapter focuses on three particular problems in communication 
scenarios, each corresponding to one of the above issues: data integrity of digital 
recorded images, user authentication in one-way broadcast services and privacy right 
in communications. The content is mainly divided into three sections. Each section 
corresponds to one problem as mentioned above.
In the first section, a cryptographic protocol is proposed to address a problem of data 
integrity, namely the certification of digital images so that they can be regarded as 
evidence for legal purposes. The protocol uses public key techniques and works by 
chaining together images from different sources in a digital signature scheme. The 
security analysis shows that it protects against manipulation of images either by a 
single party or by collaboration between one party and the certifying authority.
In the next section, a reliable key distribution scheme for one-way broadcasting is 
proposed to ensure that any possible fraud to the access control units can be detected. 
The scheme uses a conventional cryptosystem for encrypting and decrypting the 
transmitted information. A technique based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem is
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implemented to prove authorised users in the system. The scheme can be operated in 
conjunction with the existing access control units such as the set top box in pay TV 
services. It solves two security-related problems in one-way communications, that is 
proving identity of authorised users and distributing the decryption key to authorised 
users securely.
The final section is concerned with a circumstance in which the transmission of 
ciphertexts is intercepted by an attacker, who can later ask the parties to reveal the 
secret key needed to decrypt those intercepted ciphertexts. With this key, all messages 
between two parties over the past will be disclosed and may be used as evidence, in a 
court of law, of what they have been doing. An encryption scheme based on cascaded 
block algorithms is proposed to protect the right of privacy in such a situation. The 
scheme gives an opportunity to the parties to hand in a different key to a different 
message. That is, the one ciphertext has two possible decryptions, depending on the 
key used. With this scheme, the parties can claim that the decrypted message is 
genuine and the attacker cannot disprove it. The above three schemes have already 
been published and can be found in [Amomraksa et al, 1997], [Amomraksa and 
Sweeney, 1998] and [Amomraksa et al, 1999b] respectively.
3.2. Protecting the Integrity of a Sequence of Images
In many situations, it is necessary to be able to certify that a document existed on a 
certain date. For example, in the case of a copyright or patent dispute, proof of the 
date of a document may be cmcial. Haber and Stometta [1991] introduced the concept 
of time-stamping a digital document to solve this problem. From another viewpoint, 
time-stamping can also be used in order to prove the integrity of data. Video 
surveillance is one of many applications that needs data integrity since the recorded 
data can be important evidence in criminal cases. However, the ease of manipulation 
of (digital) images means that they cannot be regarded as proof in a court of law.
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In this situation, a protocol is proposed to ensure that the manipulation of digital 
images can be detected through the use of a public key cryptosystem and a one-way 
hash function. Public key cryptosystems such as RSA [Rivest et al, 1978] can also 
provide a digital signature by using the private key to sign the message and the public 
key to verify the signature. A one-way hash function, such as MD5 [Rivest, 1992] can 
also be used to verify integrity of images. These facilities alone, however, do not 
protect against alteration of data by the originator of that data, and the involvement of 
a certifying authority is required. Ideally it should be possible to protect also against 
collaboration between the originator and the certifying authority to falsify evidence.
3.2.1. Description of the Protocol
The data is considered to be digital images originating from a variety of users 
(equipment). Any user A has been given the public key of a certifying authority B. 
Images are grouped together over a defined interval and all images are subtitled with a 
hash function derived from the previous set of images from the same equipment; a 
random value can be input to the hash function to produce a subtitle for the first set of 
images. The first hash value, generated from a random number as input, is used as the 
first subtitle of the recording. Since the subtitle forms a part of the images used for 
later hashing, each hash value depends on all earlier values. This makes it impossible 
to modify the data without changes that propagate through the entire data set.
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Public Key 
Decryption
Add hash Value into 
images as Subtitle
Digital Signal 
from Camera A
Sequence of images
PkA(SkB[n, A, hh Tn, In_j, hn.It Tn.h LJ)
Figure 3.1 Operation o f Protocol
The certification of the images is carried out as shown in Figure 3.1 and described
below.
1. A signs the first hash value hi (i = 0), and encrypts his identity A, his public key 
PIca, the first hash value and his signature SIca by using PkB and sends it to B.
2. B decrypts the encrypted data and verifies A’s signature by applying PIca to SkA[hi\ 
and comparing with hi.
3. B adds the date and time Tn and a sequence number n for the received hash value 
plus linking information of the previous received data i.e., the identity In.j, the hash 
value hn-i, the date and time Tn.i and the hash value of the previous linking 
information Ln = h[In-i, hn.i, Tn-i, Ln_j].
4. B records all data and signs them by SkB , then encrypts all signed data by using 
PkA and sends them back to A.
5. A decrypts the encrypted data (n, A, hi, Tn, In.i, hn-i, Tn.i, Ln), verifies B’s signature 
by using PkB and then records all obtained data as proof of integrity of data.
6 . A follows steps 1-5 again by using hi, i =1, 2, 3, 4 respectively (/ = sequence
number of the hash values).
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3.2.2. Security Analysis
It can be seen that there are up to three parties involved in any attack i.e. recorder, 
certifying authority and the attacker. The possible attacks against the protocol as 
previously described are considered as follows:
A can get PJcb in several ways, e.g. A gets it from B directly or gets it from a public 
key database. In the first case there is protection in that the public key is known to be 
obtained from a trusted source, probably when the equipment is manufactured. If it is 
necessary for the public key of B to be obtained from a database then all public keys 
must be signed by some trusted third party known to A.
Another copy of an image cannot be created, or a new image inserted at a false point 
in the sequence, because the processes of repeating time-stamps can happen once 
only. It is also possible to compare the hash values used as subtitles by A at each 
period of time with those recorded by B.
Modification of data is prevented by the hash function since, if a single bit changes in 
the input bits, it causes a change, on average, in half of the bits in the hash value. 
Thus, the hash values which are put into images as a subtitle can be used to verify the 
integrity of data.
Even with collaboration between A and B, changing the hash values plus dates and 
times recorded at A and B is prevented by linking A’s timestamp at a particular time 
with timestamps previously generated by B. Owing to the fact that there are many 
users in the network, those timestamps will most probably be generated for other 
equipment. All hash values are linked in order, therefore B is not able to forward date 
a hash value for A since that would require knowing in advance what hash value 
request came before it. It would also be possible to check and contact the source of the 
previous data, i.e. in order to prove that A’s hash value is timestamped in the 
correct sequence.
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3.3. Key Distribution Scheme for One-Way Broadcasting
An advantage of communications over broadcast channels is that the data or signals 
which are sent from a source station can be received simultaneously by many 
destination stations. The transmitted data will often be encrypted. Only the authorised 
users who have the decryption key can decrypt the data. A good example of a secure 
broadcast scheme was proposed by Chiou and Chen [1989]. The scheme allows a user 
to send a secret message to many people at the same time. The scheme works by 
encrypting the message using the agreed key between the sender and each recipient, 
and then applying a technique based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) to 
construct one sent-out message from different versions of the ciphertexts. The 
encryption algorithm used in the scheme may be either a public key or a private key 
cryptosystem.
In one-way broadcast applications such as pay TV services, there are two important 
issues that need to be considered, namely key distribution and user authentication. It is 
obvious that the process of distributing the decryption key (sometimes called 
programme key or descrambling key) must be done carefully to protect the revenue of 
the broadcasters. Fiat and Naor [1994] introduced a key distribution scheme which is 
efficient in both transmission length and storage at the user’s end. The scheme allows 
a central broadcast site to broadcast secure transmissions to an arbitrary set of 
recipients while minimising key management related transmissions. A key distribution 
scheme based on block designs [Korjik et al, 1997] is another example. The scheme is 
claimed to be unconditionally secure and better suited for large coalitions than [Fiat 
and Naor, 1994].
In pay TV services, every authorised user {subscriber) is normally given a set top box 
and a pre-programmed smart card. They are used in co-operation as an access control 
unit to the provided services. The smart card contains a cryptoprocessor and a secret 
key in order to decrypt the programme key which is small but important to the whole 
encrypted data. After the decrypting process in the smart card, the programme key is
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passed to another cryptoprocessor in the set top box which is used for decrypting the 
transmitted data at video rates [Guillou et al, 1992].
For the process of user authentication, it can be seen that the smart card is used to 
prove to the system whether or not the card holders are authorised users. A technique 
based on zero-knowledge protocols [Schneier, 1996] can be used for this purpose. The 
zero-knowledge protocols allow identification, key exchange and other basic 
cryptographic operations to be implemented without leaking any secret information 
during the conversation and with smaller computational requirements than using 
comparable public key protocols [Fiat and Shamir, 1987]. In this situation, they allow 
the set top box to determine if the pre-programmed card inserted in the box is valid. If 
not, the set top box will refuse to decrypt any transmitted data. Thus, a secret key kept 
in the smart card becomes a function of identity of each authorised user.
Commonly, the set top box has a micro-controller which passes important data in the 
process of proving authorisation and decrypting the transmitted data between its 
cryptoprocessor and the smart card’s. This leads to a compromise of the system’s 
security because attackers can easily interpose a personal computer (PC) between the 
set top box and smart card, and then manipulate the traffic. It is known as the 
McCormac Hack [FAQ, 1998]. By tapping the data line between a set top box and a 
smart card, and then feeding the data to another set top box, that set top box would act 
as if it has the same card inserted inside. However, this flaw can be prevented by 
ensuring that each set top box will work only with its corresponding smart card. An 
efficient and secure means is therefore needed to distribute keys from one 
cryptographic device to another.
In well designed systems, the secret key should never occur in clear form outside 
cryptographic hardware, except under secure conditions when the key is first 
initialised within the cryptographic device. One possible approach is that the 
distributed programme keys should carry with them a record of the key-related 
information that indicates how and under what conditions these keys can be processed 
by using a cryptographic device. This key-related information should be linked 
cryptographically to the secret key such that it is infeasible for an attacker to cause the
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cryptographic hardware to process a key except by specifying and using the correct 
key-related information.
Based on the above approach, a reliable key distribution scheme is proposed to be 
implemented in one-way broadcast applications such as pay TV services. The scheme 
uses conventional encryption algorithms along with the CRT to validate the 
combination of a smart card and a set top box for the user authentication purpose. The 
programme keys are also transmitted to the subscribers in the network securely. That 
is, the proposed scheme performs the functions of identity proof and distributes the 
programme keys securely at the same time.
3.3.1. Description of the Scheme
The model of the key distribution system in a pay TV service will be that the user’s 
smart card wants to communicate with the set top box with the assistance of the 
broadcaster over a public channel. An attacker is assumed to be able to intercept the 
data sent from the broadcaster to the set top box, and between the smart card and the 
set top box. Thus, in the scheme, the smart card will be used to prove the authorised 
user only. The process of decrypting the programme key and the encrypted signals will 
be done within the cryptoprocessor in the set top box and not be disclosed outside. 
The technique based on the CRT is used to construct the sent-out message from 
several ciphertexts. Each individual sent-out message will be sent to the subscribers in 
the network. It is then input to the set top box and the smart card for the process of 
proving identity of authorised users and decrypting the programme key. Before 
presenting the construction method, we need to understand the mathematical 
background of the CRT. [Aho et al, 1974]
Let pi, p2, . . .p t be positive integers which are relatively prime. Let N  = pjXp2. . ,pt and 
let aj, a2,.. .at be positive integers with at<pt. Then the system of equations
x = at (modpt) ( t = l , 2 ,  3 , ......) (3.1)
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has a common solution x in the range [0, N-l] and
v f N  1—  x at x yt mod N  
i=l\Pi )_
(3.2)
where y,- x (NI pi) = 1 (mod pi) (3.3)
The value yt in (3.3) is determined by a method called Extension of Euclid’s 
Algorithm [Knuth, 1981]. The technique for constructing the sent-out message is as 
follows. Let Ri be the random number of user i £/,■ generated by the broadcaster and 
Cu, C/2 be the ciphertexts of Ri which are encrypted by a secret key kept in the smart 
card and the set top box respectively. Let Kp be the programme key used to decrypt the 
broadcast signals and Cu be the ciphertext of Kp which is encrypted by another secret 
key kept in the set top box. Let pi (>Cu), P2 (>Cu) and p 3 (>Q?) be relatively prime 
integers which are agreed to be used in the scheme. Consider the following 
congruence equations:
The common solution x can be computed using the CRT and let this value x be the 
sent-out message. Whoever has p 3 will be able to compute Cu from x. Also, with the 
secret key kept in the set top box, Cu can be decrypted to recover Kp.
In the system, each smart card contains a secret key KSim and a prime number p Si,n. 
Each set top box contains a secret key Kbox, and two prime numbers pboxi and pb0X2 • 
That is, each user has one smart card containing Ki_sim and pt sim, and one set top box 
containing KLbox, Pijboxi and pi_b0X2 - The operations of the scheme are described below.
x = Cu ( mod p i ) 
x = C/2 ( mod p2 ) 
x = Ci3 ( mod p3 )
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Scheme for Encryption
1. The broadcaster generates a programme key Kp used for encrypting the broadcast 
signals, and then generates a random number R i  for an user i t//.
2. The broadcaster encrypts that random number by using the secret key Ki_Sim kept in 
the smart card of Then, he encrypts Ri and Kp by using the secret key Ki box kept 
in the set top box of
C u  — E i K sim  ( f c i )
C i2  =  E j _K box  (E -i)
C i3  — E i K box ( K p )
where C u , C/2 and C/3 are the ciphertexts of R i , Rt and Kp encrypted by
Ki_simi Kijbox and Kij,0x respectively.
3. The broadcaster computes the sent-out message x/ of [7/ from equations (3.2) and
(3.3).
X/ =  C u  m o d  ( P i sim )
Xi =  C/2 m od ( PiJjoxl )
Xi — Ci3 mod ( Pi_box2 )
He needs to repeat all the processes above until he gets x/ for every user. Finally, 
the broadcaster transmits the number x/ of every user along with the encrypted 
signals over the broadcast channel.
Scheme for Decryption
1. Each user Ui receives the transmitted data and looks for his corresponding number 
x/. This number will be sent to his smart card and his set top box as input.
2. At the smart card, Cu  is computed from x,- and decrypts Cu  by Ki_sim to get Ri, 
which is the plaintext of Cu  decrypted by Ki_Sim.
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C u  — X/ m o d  (  P i  s im  )  
P i  =  D i_ K s im  ( C u )
3. At the set top box, C/2 is computed from xt and decrypts C/2 by Ki box to get another 
Ri, which is the plaintext of C/2 decrypted by Ki_box.
4. The smart card sends Ri to the set top box. Then, the set top box compares the two 
numbers to determine whether they are identical. If not, the decryption process 
stops and informs the user i.
5. If the values are the same, the set top box continues to computes C/3 from jt/ and 
decrypts C/3 by Ki_box to get the programme key Kp.
The cryptoprocessor in the set top box uses Kp to decrypt the broadcast signals. The 
principle of the encryption and decryption schemes is illustrated in Figure 3.2 and 3.3.
C/2 — Xi m o d  ( P ijboxl )
R i ~  D i  Kbox (C/2)
C /3 — Xi m o d  ( Pi_box2 ) 
K p  =  C^i_kbox (C/3)
Transmit a number x i for user i
Xi — [ ^i_Ksim ( R i) ]  mod ( Pi_sim )
X i = [ E;_Kbox (R i) ] mod ( P i boxl )
Xi =  [ E i Kbox (K p )  ] mod ( P i box2 )
Broadcaster
where R i =  a random number 
K p  =  a. programme key 
P i_sim , Pi_boxi,2 =  CRT parameters
Figure 3.2 Principle o f Encryption Scheme
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Stops and informs 
the user
not equalSmart Card performs 
R i =  r)i_Ksim (%i m od ( P i sif/i ))
Compare R i
Set-Top Box performs 
R i =  t i i  Kbox (-T/ mod ( p  i_boxl ))
equal Set-Top Box performs 
K p  = D ijbox  (xi mod ( pi_box2))
Figure 3.3 Principle o f Decryption Scheme
3.3.2. Security Analysis
From the scheme, we can see that there are three parts involved in the system, that is, 
broadcaster, smart card and set top box. The possible attacks against the scheme are 
considered as follows:
Attackers can intercept the data sent from the broadcaster to the set top box but they 
still need the programme key to decrypt the signals. In the scheme, the ciphertext of 
programme key is not transmitted in the clear. It is constructed into the sent-out 
message by using the CRT. Therefore, the attackers need to determine pt_b0x2 kept in 
the set top box first in order to obtain the ciphertext of programme key.
All the processes of decrypting are carried out within the cryptoprocessor in the set top 
box, which outputs the decrypted data to outside devices only. Thus, there is no way 
for the attackers to obtain the encryption key kept in the set top box. (The set top box 
is assumed to be a tamper-resistant module). Attackers may intercept the data sent 
between the smart card and the set top box, that is, Ri but they still do not have enough 
information to break the process of identity proving. Moreover, that information 
cannot be used with other set top boxes because the decrypted data will be different.
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It may appear to be a disadvantage that the smart card must be used with a specific set 
top box but this approach can protect against illegal smart cards (copying or cloning). 
Those illegal cards will not be able to be used with other set top boxes because they 
will decrypt the data which is different from that of the set top box, and the set top box 
will then refuse to decrypt the encrypted programme key.
Another advantage is that the broadcaster is the only person who controls the 
communications between the smart card and the set top box. If the security of either 
the smart card or the set top box is compromised, the broadcaster just puts in different 
data at step 2  of the encryption process that would make the set top box refuse to do 
its work. Also, the smart card can be reused with other set top boxes with the same 
level of security. (Provided the combination is known to the broadcaster).
3.4. Hiding Ciphertext by Cascading Algorithms
Consider a situation in which the transmission of ciphertexts can be intercepted by an 
attacker who can later ask the receiver to reveal the key used to decrypt the 
ciphertexts, thereby disclosing the messages sent. Assume that the attacker has the 
power to approach the receiver or the sender, (or both) after the ciphertexts were 
transmitted, and demand to see all the secret information, that is, the decryption key 
and the algorithm used for the decrypting process. For example, Alice (a sender) and 
Bob (a receiver) have been exchanging encrypted messages for some time. Eve (an 
attacker and an agent of secret police) has been collecting them all, but she cannot 
decrypt any of them. Finally, Eve tires of all this unreadable ciphertext and has the 
pair arrested. She then demands that Alice and Bob reveal the decryption key. In this 
situation, the privacy of all communications between Alice and Bob will be violated 
and may be used as evidence in a court of law of what they have been doing. From the 
assumption that messages contain considerable redundancy, if a wrong key is used for 
decrypting some standard encryption of a message, the result will be unreadable. The 
attacker can use this fact to prove whether the key she is given is the real one.
48
Chapter 3 Implementations o f Cryptography
One method that can be used to protect the right of privacy in such a situation is to 
create a scheme which is able to encrypt a message such that there are two possible 
decryptions, each with a different key. Such a scheme is frequently based on the idea 
of hiding ciphertext. With this scheme, Alice can encrypt a real message to Bob in one 
of the keys and another dummy message in the other key. If Bob is asked to reveal the 
decryption key, he hands in the key to the dummy message. As long as the attacker 
cannot find a method to prove that the key which has been handed in is not the real 
key, the real message is still kept secret.
3.4.1. Techniques of Hiding Ciphertext
A simple technique is to use one-time pads [Schneier, 1996]. For example, let Mj be 
the message, M2 the dummy message, C the ciphertext, Kj the real key, and K2 the 
dummy key. Alice encrypts Mp Mj ® Kj = C. Alice and Bob share Ki, so Bob can 
decrypt C: C ® Kj = M\. If the attacker asks them to hand in the key, they do not hand 
in Kj, but instead hand in K?. K2 = C © M2 . The attacker then recovers M2 : M2 = C © 
K2 . Since these are one-time pads and Kj is completely random, there is no way to 
prove that K2 is not the real key. However, using this approach is very inconvenient 
since the parties must keep every ciphertext encrypted under different keys C,-: Q  = M* 
© in case of attack. A similar idea, based on joining ciphertexts, may be 
considered; that is the ciphertexts of different messages, encrypted with different keys, 
are concatenated to make the final ciphertext. When the attacker comes, the party 
claims that the key he used is the one that corresponds to the message he wishes to 
open. For instance, Alice sends a message to Bob by encrypting Mi with a symmetric 
algorithm and Ki, and M2 with K2 . The ciphertexts of those are concatenated by an 
interleaving technique so that certain designated bits are real and the others are the 
dummy encrypted message. If the attacker demands the key, Alice or Bob just gives 
him K2 and the designation of the dummy bits and claims that all non-designated bits 
are artificially introduced random padding, designed to frustrate cryptanalysis. Since
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the explanation is so implausible, the attacker will probably not believe them and then 
realise that she is being cheated.
Another interesting technique is based on subliminal channels [Simmons, 1994], 
where the attacker cannot distinguish whether or not another message is hidden in the 
transmitted information. In [Simmons, 1984], the author described the concept of a 
subliminal channel in a conventional digital signature algorithm. The circumstance 
which is suitable for this technique will be that Alice wants to exchange messages in 
the clear with Bob in the full view of Eve (similar to a prisoner’s communications). 
Since the messages are hidden in what looks like normal digital signatures, the 
attacker will see signed innocuous messages pass back and forth, but completely miss 
the information being sent over the subliminal channel. In fact, the subliminal channel 
signature algorithm is indistinguishable from a normal signature algorithm, at least to 
the attacker. The attacker not only cannot read the subliminal message, he also has no 
idea that one is even present. This approach, based on subliminal channels, has been 
proved by many cryptographers to be secure against all possible attacks. However, it 
has a drawback of allowing only 20 or so characters of subliminal message to be sent 
per signed innocuous message. Hence, this approach is much more suitable for 
sending keys than messages.
Recently, another technique called deniable encryption was proposed [Canetti et al, 
1997]. The technique used in the scheme is based on the following idea. Assume that 
the sender can pick an element in some domain either randomly or pseudorandomly, 
and the receiver with some secret information can tell whether the element was chosen 
randomly or pseudorandomly whereas the attacker cannot tell the difference. Then, the 
sender can proceed as follows: to encrypt a 0 or 1 send, respectively, a random or a 
pseudorandom element. The receiver will be able to decrypt correctly, but if a 
pseudorandom element e was transmitted, the sender can claim that e was randomly 
chosen and the attacker will not be able to tell the difference. Various public key 
deniable encryption schemes were constructed using this technique.
The technique applied in the proposed encryption scheme is quite similar to the 
technique of joining ciphertexts. That is, the final ciphertext will be constructed from
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the ciphertexts of different messages. However, the method of extracting the hidden 
ciphertext is different since an alternative encryption scheme is used in the decrypting 
process. This scheme is also purported to have been used in the encrypting process 
and the attacker cannot disprove it.
3.4.2. Description of the Proposed Scheme
The scheme involves two block algorithms, namely a standard algorithm and a private 
algorithm which are cascaded (i.e. applied in succession). The standard algorithm can 
be any encryption algorithm which is widely accepted to be secure such as DES. For 
choosing the private algorithm, the user must note that when the two algorithms are 
cascaded, the security of the whole system should not be compromised. However, so 
long as the keys for the algorithms are independent, the resultant cascade will be at 
least as difficult to break as the first algorithm in the cascade [Maurer and Massey, 
1993].
The private (constructing) algorithm (using the CRT) which will actually be used by 
the parties to construct the final ciphertext, is first described. Then the alternative 
private algorithm which will be purported to have been used if an attacker enquires is 
presented. For the former algorithm, the technique for constructing the final ciphertext 
is as follows.
Let Ci and C2 be the ciphertexts of messages Mi and M2 , which are encrypted using 
the standard algorithm with keys Ki and K2 respectively. M2 will be a dummy 
message, Mi the real message. Let pi (>C;) and P2 (>C2 ) be relatively prime integers
which are agreed between the parties. They are used as secret keys and K^P2^  for 
the private algorithm. Consider the following congruence equations:
x= C i (mod pi) 
x = C 2 (mod p2)
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Referring to equations (3.2) and (3.3), the common solution x  can be computed using
the CRT and this value becomes the final ciphertext. In full, the processes of
operations are as follows:
Encryption Process
1. First, the sender creates the dummy message M2 with the same length as Mi. Then, 
he encrypts those messages using the standard algorithm with K2 and Ki 
respectively and gets C,- =E^. (A/,*) (i = 1, 2).
2. Each ciphertext is broken into a series of blocks, where a block represents an 
integer between 0 and the corresponding prime number i.e. 0 < C ij < pj and 0 < 
C2 J < P2 •
3. Block j  of the final ciphertext (Xj) is calculated from equations (3.2) and (3.3) as 
follows:
xj= [(p 2 ><CijXyi) + (pi x C2j  x y2) ] mod (p2 x p 2)
where y i X p 2 = 1 (mod pi) and y2 x p i  = 1 (mod p2).
The value yj and y2 are determined by the same method as used to solve equation 
(3.3). This calculation is performed for each block of Cj and C2 until all of them 
are done. The output, which is the series of x/s, is transmitted to the receiver.
Decryption Process
1. The receiver has the transmitted ciphertext i.e. the series of x/s. He extracts Ci 
from each block of the ciphertext by decrypting xj using the private algorithm 
w ith ^ (/7l):
C ij = Xj mod pi.
2. Then, he decrypts C? using the standard algorithm with Kj to obtain Mf.
Mi = D  Kl(Ci).
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This decrypting process is as fast as with the standard algorithm alone since the 
method of decrypting in the private algorithm is very low in complexity compared to 
the standard algorithm.
The private algorithm of the alternative cascade of algorithms for which this 
decryption process still applies is described as follows. For a given key K^p\  the 
ciphertext C is generated from a message M  by C = M  + (rx/?), where r is a number 
produced from a real random number generator (using a non-reproducible seed of 
fixed bit length) and p>M. When this private algorithm and a standard algorithm are 
cascaded and applied, the generated ciphertext will be Cz = EK(Mi) + (rxp), where K
and are chosen to be independent. Figure 3.4 illustrates the principle of the 
proposed scheme, where the cascade of algorithm A and B refer to the alternative 
cascade of algorithms and the one that is used in the constructing processes 
respectively.
Cascade of 
Algorithms B
Cascade of 
Algorithms A
Cascade of 
Algorithms A
Messages 
M i  and M 2
Message
Ciphertext
>  Attacker
Messages 
M i  or M 2
Figure 3.4. Principle o f the Proposed Scheme
3.4.3. Security Analysis and Efficiency
When the attacker, who has the intercepted ciphertexts, demands the decryption keys
from the parties, he will be given K2 andi^^2^  and told to follow the decryption
process above with K ^  and K2 replacing and Ki respectively. He obtains M2 , 
and since this decrypted message is meaningful, he may consider this a ‘proof’ that the 
keys he is given are the real ones. However, he may be suspicious of the length of the 
encrypted message and may then think that there is something hidden in the
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ciphertext. In that case, the parties may need to reveal the encryption scheme and they 
will then declare the alternative one.
The parties can justify their use of this cascade of algorithms rather than any standard 
encryption by explaining the benefit of obtaining a different ciphertext even when the 
same message is encrypted another time. This point also means that the attacker 
cannot expect to check the validity of M2 by encrypting it and comparing with the 
intercepted ciphertext. If, further, the parties are required to declare the fixed bit 
length of r, this is given as size of pi which is consistent with the block length of the 
intercepted ciphertext.
From another point of view, it can be considered that the scheme fails if the attacker 
can find out the other different meaningful messages decrypted from the same 
intercepted ciphertext. Assuming the attacker knows that the private algorithm 
involves reduction by the same modulo piXp2 for each block, it may not be difficult 
for him to guess piXp2 from the range of values of xj transmitted and so deduce pi (he
has K P^l)). However, guessing the product of the prime numbers can be made more 
difficult by increasing the number of primes (and hence of dummy messages) and/or 
the size of those primes which will of course increase the message extension. In any 
case, as mentioned earlier, the scheme is at least as secure as the standard algorithm. 
According to [Lai, 1992], ciphers are usually considered acceptable if they can 
withstand a known-plaintext attack with the assumption that the cryptanalyst has an 
arbitrary number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs. The standard algorithm used in the 
scheme should at least withstand known-plaintext attacks.
It is important to note that the parties in the system are exchanging messages that 
could to some extent be predicted. The attacker must have enough evidence before he 
comes to the receiver and may come with a writ ready prepared. If he gets a dummy 
message which is totally different from what he expected, he may realise that he has 
been deceived. In order to make the attacker more convinced, the dummy message 
should be changed every time and should be credible as a real message.
54
Chapter 3 Implementations o f Cryptography
3.5. Conclusions
This chapter has addressed three security-related problems in various communication 
scenes. Solutions for such problems, based on cryptographic protocols, have been 
proposed. To ensure that any flaw from the manipulation of digital images can be 
detected, a protocol which applied the use of a public key algorithm and a one-way 
hash function has been proposed. Referring to the security analysis part, the protocol 
protects also against collaboration between the originator and the certifying authority 
to falsify evidence.
To authenticate the authorised users in one-way broadcast services, a key distribution 
scheme for one-way broadcast channels has been proposed. Conventional encryption 
algorithms are used for the encrypting the broadcast signals. In order to obtain the 
programme key, which is sent over a broadcast channel, the particular set top box and 
its corresponding smart card must be used together. The scheme verifies the 
authorised user by comparing the decrypted data (i.e. a random number) from the 
smart card and the set top box. The logical result is then used to control the process of 
decrypting the encrypted programme key in the set top box. With this scheme, the user 
authentication and secure key distribution purposes can be achieved at the same time.
To protect the right of privacy in communications between two parties, an encryption 
scheme has been proposed which cascades two algorithms. A technique based on the 
CRT is used to generate a ciphertext. This decrypts to a different message if it is 
supposed that a certain alternative cascading of algorithms was used and the attacker 
cannot disprove this supposition. One advantage of using this scheme is that the 
parties need only to keep the small number of keys, that is, Ki, K2 , K^Pl>} and K P^l^. 
There is, however, a disadvantage in the scheme, namely that putting in extra 
messages extends the final ciphertext, but this can be considered as a minor drawback 
if this type of security is required.
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Chapter 4 
Reduced Complexity Encryption
4.1. Introduction
The advantage of asymmetric algorithms over symmetric algorithms is that one of the 
key pair can be made public so that anyone can use that (public) key to encrypt or to 
authenticate a message. However, since the security of asymmetric algorithms relies 
on the difficulty of mathematical problems, most of them involve complex 
computations, typically involving raising a large number to a large power. The RSA 
algorithm is an example. It is generally 100 to 1000 times slower than (block) 
symmetric algorithms such as DES [Schneier, 1996]. This drawback sometimes 
makes the asymmetric algorithms impractical to be used for encrypting large amounts 
of data, especially in applications which require a high bit rate such as digital TV 
services. Normally, the use of asymmetric algorithms is to encrypt the secret key of a 
symmetric algorithm and that symmetric algorithm with the secret key is used to 
encrypt the data instead. This is, as mentioned in section 2.3, the principle of hybrid 
cryptosystems.
In this chapter, a situation where a large amount of data is required to be encrypted 
directly by an asymmetric algorithm is considered. A novel encryption method, in 
which block encryption algorithms, either symmetric or asymmetric, may be applied, 
is proposed to reduce the complexity in the encryption process, while the security
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level of the whole system remains the same. The encryption method has been filed for 
patent in the UK [Amomraksa and Sweeney, 1999d].
4.2. Basic Approach
An encryption method is designed for encrypting a digital bit stream consisting of a 
plurality of data blocks. (A large file of video stream is chosen as an example to be 
encrypted). Instead of encrypting the whole video stream, in the proposed method, a 
small portion of data is pseudorandomly extracted from that video stream to be 
encrypted and that encrypted part is used to protect the whole video stream. To obtain 
the original video stream, one needs to decrypt this encrypted part. That is, the 
security of the system relies on the encrypted part only. However, the method works 
with sufficient security only if applied to the data in compressed form. The basic 
approach of the above idea can be described as follows:
The digital bit stream is broken into successive data blocks of the same length. Each 
data block is then transformed using a discrete linear transform to generate a 
respective set of transformation coefficients. One of the transformation coefficients in 
each set is selected pseudorandomly and the selected coefficients are formed into a 
block of plaintext which is encrypted using a block cipher to create a block of 
ciphertext. The blocks of plaintext and ciphertext are differenced to form a set of 
difference values, each corresponding to a respective data block. Each difference 
value is then inverse-transformed using a corresponding inverse transform to generate 
a set of inverse-transformation values which are added to the data values in the 
respective data block to generate a corresponding ciphertext. The block diagram of the 
basic approach is shown in Figure 4.1.
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Output ciphertext
IDCT
Encryption
Pseudo­
randomly
selected
DCT
Input plaintext
Figure 4.1 Block Diagram o f Basic Approach
Obviously, there are many discrete linear transforms being used in digital signal 
processing, for example, Karhunen-Loeve transform, discrete Fourier transform, 
discrete cosine transform, etc. One of them is chosen to be used as an example in the 
encryption scheme, that is, the discrete cosine transform (DCT).
4.3. Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT)
The discrete cosine transform [Ahmed, 1974] is widely used in image and speech 
transform coding because there exist fast algorithms for its calculation, and this is the 
main reason for choosing the DCT to be implemented in the proposed scheme.
In general, the DCT is a particular case of the Fourier transform applied to discrete 
(sampled) signals. It decomposes the signal into only one series of harmonic cosine 
functions in phase with the signal, which reduces by half the number of coefficients 
necessary to describe the signal compared to the Fourier transform. Note that the 
Fourier transform decomposes a periodic signal into a series of sine and cosine 
harmonic functions.
In the subject of video coding, the image is separated into blocks typically 8x8 or 
16x16 pixels, which the DCT transforms into a matrix of 8x8 or 16x16 coefficients
58
Chapter 4 Reduced Complexity Encryption
respectively. (Each pixel contains 8 bit information which represents the values 
between 0 to 256). In order to reduce the complexity of the computation and the 
processing time required in transformation process, the block size chosen is generally 
8x8 pixels. This block size is also optimum for trade-off between compression 
efficiency and computational complexity [Clarke, 1995]. Although a larger block size 
leads to more efficient coding, it requires more computational power.
After arranging the input data into blocks of 8x8 pixels, the two-dimensional DCT is 
then applied to each block of them to obtain the transformation coefficients. The 2-D 
forward DCT (FDCT) is described by the following formula. In this formula the pixel 
values are represented as s(x, y) and the transform coefficients as S(u, v):
with u, v, x, y = 0, 1, 2,.. .7
where x, y are spatial co-ordinates in the pixel domain (sample value) 
u, v are co-ordinates in the transform domain ( DCT coefficient) 
1
C(u) = for u = 0, otherwise 1 
1
C(v) = —f= for v = 0, otherwise 1
In the transformed block, coefficients on the horizontal axis represent increasing 
horizontal frequencies from left to right, and on the vertical axis they represent 
increasing vertical frequencies from top to bottom. The first coefficient in the top left 
comer (co-ordinates: 0, 0) represents null horizontal and vertical frequencies, and the
7  7
E X  •s(x,y) cos 
x=o^ =o
and the inverse DCT (IDCT) is given as follows:
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bottom right coefficient represents the highest spatial frequency component in the two 
directions. The coefficient at the top left comer is called the D C coefficient, whereas 
the rest of the coefficients are called A C  coefficients. The basis functions of the DCT 
is illustrated in Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2 D CT Basis Functions
To reduce the number of calculations required to perform the 2-D transform described 
by equation (4.1) and (4.2), a one-dimensional transform can be used instead. That is, 
the same result can be achieved by applying a 1-D transform along all the rows of the 
block and then down the columns of the block. The computational complexity can be 
further reduced by replacing the cosine form of the transforms with a fast algorithm 
[Chen, 1977] which reduces the operation to a short series of multiplications and 
additions. The 1-D FDCT and IDCT are described by the following formula.
FDCT :S(u) =
C{u)
cos
x=0
n ( 2 x  +1) u 
16
(4.3)
C(u)
ID C T :^ * ) = 2 j —T— S(u) cos
u = 0  2
n ( 2 x  + 1) u 
16
(4.4)
with u, x  = 0, 1, 2,. ...7
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where x  is the spatial co-ordinate in the pixel domain (sample value) 
u is the co-ordinate in the transform domain ( DCT coefficient)
1
C(u)= for u = 0, otherwise 1
The 2-D FDCT and IDCT can then be constructed from products of the terms of a 
horizontal 1-D DCT (using u and x) and a vertical 1-D DCT (using v and y), where v 
represents vertical frequencies and y represents vertical displacements.
4.4. Description of the Scheme
According to the encryption method previously described, the encryption scheme can 
be divided into four main steps. That is, transforming the data blocks of the digital bit 
stream, selecting a part of each transformed block and combining the selected parts to 
form a block of plaintext, encrypting that block of plaintext, and modifying the data 
blocks using the difference between blocks of plaintext and ciphertext whereby to 
encrypt the digital bit stream. However, in practice, steps one and two can be 
combined into one operation. This is done by calculating only one DCT coefficient at 
the particular position chosen pseudorandomly.
The encryption scheme is now described by way of example. The asymmetric 
algorithm used in encryption process is the 1024-bit RSA algorithm and the 8x8 DCT 
is used in the transformation process. A pseudorandom number generator is also used 
in the scheme. It generates a sequence of numbers (ranging from 2 to the maximum 
size of transformation block), and each successive number in the sequence determines 
the position u of the selected DCT coefficient for each successive block in the digital 
bit stream. It will be appreciated that the first DCT coefficient (u = 1) represents the 
DC component in the frequency domain and is ignored in the selection process. The 
block diagram of the encryption scheme is shown in Figure 4.3.
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Information
Location Seed
Transmit
DCT
IDCT
Random no. 
Generator
Ciphertext o f Seed
Ciphertext o f  
Coefficients
RSA
Encryption
RSA
Encryption
Ciphertext of 
Information
Figure 4.3 Block Diagram o f Encryption Scheme
(1) D a ta  b lock  in tim e dom ain (2) D C T  data  blocks into frequ en cy dom ain (3) E ncryption  p ro cess  
using RSA (4) B locks o f  p la in tex t an d  ciphertext are  differenced (5) ID C T  the difference into 
tim e dom ain (6) The difference is ad d ed  to  da ta  b lock to fo rm  the fin a l ciphertex t
The flow diagram of the encryption scheme in more detail is shown in Figure 4.4 and 
its operation is described as follows.
1. The input digital bit stream is broken into successive blocks of the same length. 
Ending block is padded to the same length. In this example, the scheme processes a
digital bit stream consisting of 128 successive data block Bj, B2  B m  at a time.
Each block contains 64 bytes and each byte represents an 8-bit data value.
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2. The DCT transforms the 64 data values s(x) in the respective block from the time 
domain to the frequency domain thereby generating a corresponding set of 64 DCT 
coefficients S(u) for the block.
3. One only of the 64 DCT coefficients derived from each block is selected, and the 
selected coefficients for all the blocks are grouped together to form a block of
plaintext consisting of 128 selected DCT coefficients Siiui), 8 2 (112)  Smium)- (See
step 1 in Figure 4.4). The position u of a selected DCT coefficient within the 
respective transform is determined pseudorandomly by means of a pseudorandom 
number generator operating in accordance with a pseudorandom seed.
4. The block of plaintext (1024 bits) is encrypted using the RSA algorithm to form a 
corresponding block of ciphertext (1024 bits) (step 2).
5. The blocks of plaintext and ciphertext are differenced, and the resultant difference 
is de-grouped to form a set of 8-bit difference values di(uj), d2 (u2)....dm (ui28), 
each corresponding to a respective data blockBj, B2 ....B128 (step 3).
6. The IDCT transforms each difference value d(u) from the frequency domain to the 
time domain (all the other coefficients S(u) in the IDCT are set at zero), and 
generates a respective set of inverse-transformed value s(x) (step 4). Note that the 
position of each difference value d(u) in the respective IDCT is the same as the 
position of the selected DCT coefficient S(u) in the corresponding DCT and, to that 
end, the IDCT is supplied with the same sequence of numbers generated by the 
pseudorandom number generator.
7. The inverse-transformed values s(x) in each set are added to the respective data 
values in the corresponding data block using modular arithmetic. In this manner, 
the encryption method adds a random value to the original data values to generate a 
corresponding ciphertext (step 5).
The pseudorandom seed is also encrypted using the RSA algorithm to generate a 
ciphertext of the seed. The ciphertext of the seed, the ciphertext of the selected DCT 
coefficients and the ciphertext of the original data values are then combined to create a 
sent-out message. Figure 4.5 illustrates the frames structure of the sent-out message.
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Bj B2 B]28
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Step 4
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First Coeff 8 bit
.64 bytes...
Second Coeff 8 bit
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of Information
.64 bytes...
128th 8 bits o f  
the difference
Find DCT at 
location u 
derived 
from random no.
Find IDCT at 
location u. Other 
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from random no.
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locations = 0
RSA Encryption (1024 bits)
Compute the difference between 
ciphertext and plaintext
Figure 4.4 Flow Diagram o f Encryption Scheme in More Detail
Ciphertext Ciphertext of Ciphertext o f Ciphertext o f Ciphertext o f
of Seed Coefficients Information Coefficients Information
128 bytes 128 bytes 8192 bytes 128 bytes 8192 bytes
Figure 4.5 Basic Frame Structure o f Sent-out Message
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To recover the original bit stream, the process is simple and straightforward. Figure 
4.6 illustrates the block diagram of the decryption scheme used to decrypt a digital bit 
stream which has been encrypted using the encryption scheme of Figure 4.3.
Receive
Seed
LocationIDCT
Random no. 
Generator
Ciphertext o f Seed
Ciphertext o f  
Coefficients
RSA
Decryption
RSA
Decryption
Ciphertext of 
Information
Information
Figure 4.6 Block Diagram o f Decryption Scheme
(1) D ecryp tion  p ro cess  using RSA (2) B locks o f  p la in tex t and  c iphertex t a re  d ifferenced  
(3) ID C T  the difference into tim e dom ain (4) The difference is su b trac ted  fro m  
data  b lock to  recover the orig inal inform ation
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The flow diagram of the decryption scheme in more details is shown in Figure 4.4 and
its operation is described as follows.
1. Initially, the ciphertext generated by encrypting the selected DCT coefficients and 
which forms part of the sent-out message, is decrypted using the RSA algorithm.
2. The encrypted and decrypted values are differenced, and the resultant difference is 
de-grouped to form a set of 8-bit difference values, each corresponding to a 
respective data block in the original bit stream.
3. Each difference value is then inverse-transformed using IDCT similar to that used 
in the described encryption scheme. The position of each difference value in the 
respective IDCT is again determined by the out of a pseudorandom number 
generator, and all the other coefficients in the IDCT are set at zero. The 
pseudorandom number generator generates the same sequence of numbers as that 
generated by pseudorandom number generator used in the encryption scheme and, 
to that end, the pseudorandom number generator is controlled by the same 
pseudorandom seed as also used in the encryption scheme. This is generated by 
decrypting the ciphertext of the seed contained in the sent-out message using 
further RSA algorithm.
4. The inverse-transformed values derived from the difference values are subtracted 
from the ciphertext of the original data values contained in the sent-out message 
using modular arithmetic whereby to reconstitute the original digital bit stream.
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Figure 4.7 Flow Diagram o f Decryption Scheme in More Detail
4.5. Performance Analysis
As already described, only one of 64 DCT coefficients derived from each block Bj,
B2  Bj28 is subjected to the RSA encryption process. Thus, in the present example,
where the digital bit stream consist of 128 data blocks, each containing 64 bytes (a total 
of 8192 bytes) the RSA encryption process need only be applied to a block of plaintext 
containing a mere 128 bytes. This gives a very considerable saving in computation time; 
indeed, compared with a conventional method in which the encryption/decryption 
operation is applied to all the data bytes, the described method gives a reduction rate of
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1/64, corresponding to a reduction in computation time of 98.4375 %. In this connection 
it will be understood that the adding and subtracting operations used in the present 
method involve a negligible amount of computation time compared with the 
encryption/decryption operations used in the scheme.
In this example, the transformation operations are carried using an 8x8 DCT and an 
8x8 IDCT. However, it will be appreciated that any other suitable transformation 
operation could alternatively be used, such as a discrete Fourier transform (DFT) and 
an inverse discrete Fourier transform (IDFT). The block size of transformation can 
also be varied which results in the reduction rate of 1 In, where n is the maximum 
number of samples in transformation block.
One disadvantage of the scheme, similar to any block cipher, is that an error occurring 
in the encrypted block will make the whole decrypted block corrupt. For instance, 
according to the frame structure of the sent-out message, if an error occurs in the 
ciphertext of the selected DCT coefficients, it will introduce a large amount of errors 
in the recovered digital bit stream. The increasing bandwidth required for transmitting 
the sent-out message is another disadvantage. Since the ciphertexts of the selected 
DCT coefficients and pseudorandom seed are transmitted along with the ciphertext of 
the digital bit stream, the size of sent-out message will be expanded by around 1.02 %. 
However, this can be considered as a minor drawback compared to its benefit.
4.6. Security Analysis
This section discusses the number of possible attack against the encryption method. It 
can be seen that there are up to three parts involved in any attack, that is, the 
encryption algorithms, the pseudorandom number generator and the ciphertext of 
digital bit stream.
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4.6.1. Attack against Encryption Algorithms
In the given example, the RSA algorithm is used in the encryption/decryption process. 
The reliability of the RSA algorithm depends on the size of the ciphertext which it 
generates. In the described example, the ciphertext generated by the RSA encryption 
process consists of a 1024-bit number, and this is considered to give an adequate level 
of security. A ciphertext consisting of a 2048-bit number would give an even greater 
level of security; however, this would require much more computation time. In 
practice, the alternative block encryption algorithms either symmetrical or 
asymmetrical algorithms could be used provided, of course, these give an adequate 
level of security.
4.6.2. Attack against Pseudorandom Number Generator
Provided the pseudorandom seed remains secret it should not be possible to discover 
the pseudorandom sequence of numbers used to determine the locations of 
coefficients in the transformation and inverse-transformation operations of the 
scheme. Furthermore, the security of the overall system is not wholly reliant on the 
locations of these coefficients, but depends also on the security of the encryption 
algorithm. Assuming the attacker can produce the same pseudorandom sequence of 
numbers used in the encrypting scheme, he still needs to break a block cipher i.e. the 
RSA algorithm in order to obtain the plaintext of each data block. Therefore, even if it 
is possible to discover the pseudorandom seed, and so the locations of the coefficients 
in the respective transformations and inverse-transformations, the encryption 
algorithm should still provide an adequate level of security.
4.6.3. Attack against Ciphertext of Digital Bit Stream
As already described, the encryption method adds a random value to the original data 
values. Accordingly, it is not possible to recover the original data values from the
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corresponding ciphertext directly, without at least having knowledge of the encryption 
algorithm used in the encryption scheme.
Since block ciphers are used in the scheme, according to section 2.11, the ciphertext 
may leak some useful information to the attackers. To illustrate the effect of this type 
of weakness, the same images ‘T esf and ‘Lena’ were encrypted again using the 
described method and the result are shown in Figure 4.8 and 4.9.
Test
Figure 4.8 Encryption o f  Raw Image ‘Test’ using the Proposed M ethod
a) Original Image b) Encrypted Image
Figure 4.9 Encryption o f Raw Image ‘L ena’ using the Proposed M ethod  
a) Original Image b) Encrypted Image
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It can be seen from the encrypted image of ‘Test’ that its contents are entirely hidden 
and each pixel looks random. However, the contents in the encrypted image of ‘Lena’ 
is clearly seen as the original image. This is because of the DCT characteristic which 
is used in the encryption scheme and this weakness normally happens when applied to 
the so-called uncompressed continuous-tone image. Although the image is encrypted 
using different modes such CBC mode, the problem still remains. Nevertheless, 
compressing the data before applying the proposed encryption method can protect 
against this kind of weakness.
4.7. Conclusions
In this chapter, the problem of encrypting large amount of data, especially by using the 
asymmetric algorithms, has been addressed and an encryption method has been 
proposed to cope with that kind of data, such as, the compressed video stream. In the 
encryption scheme, the discrete linear transforms such as DCT are implemented in 
conjunction with the asymmetric algorithms such as the RSA in order to reduce the 
computation time required in encryption/decryption process, while maintaining a high 
level of security. From the given example, the computational complexity when 
encrypting a file is reduced by 98.4375 % compared to the conventional encryption 
method. The security of the whole system mainly relies on the block ciphers used in the 
scheme, which can be either symmetrical or asymmetrical algorithms. According to its 
advantage, the proposed method may therefore be used in applications which require a 
high bit rate e.g. in the provision of subscription broadcast services, such as digital TV 
services.
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Chapter 5 
Secure Distribution of Copyright Data
5.1. Introduction
Copyright protection for multimedia data is an important issue since the digital data 
can be copied repeatedly without loss of quality and it is difficult to differentiate 
illegal copies from the original or legal one. One method of copyright protection is the 
addition to the multimedia data of a watermark which carries some information e.g. 
the copyright owner or the sender or receiver. Therefore, watermarking enables 
identification and tracing of different copies of distributed data. In some multimedia 
applications such as video distribution over the World Wide Web, the watermark is a 
digital code embedded in the video signal which typically indicates the copyright 
owner. In such cases where watermarks are applied to individual copies of the video, 
each is referred to as a fingerprint i.e. the identity of the receiver of the copy.
In the distribution process, the video sequence may be transmitted in encrypted form 
from a local distributor (merchant) to an end-user (buyer). The video sequence should 
at least contain fingerprint information to enable the merchant to identify the original 
buyer of any redistributed copy. Several fingerprinting schemes have been proposed 
for this kind of application to ensure that the deception will not occur during the 
transaction process between the merchant and buyer.
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In classical fingerprinting schemes, e.g. [Boneh and Shaw, 1995], the merchant sees 
the fingerprinted copy before the encrypting process, that is both parties know the 
fingerprinted copy. This leads to the problem of proving to a third party that it was the 
buyer who made the illegal copy, not the merchant. Using the asymmetric 
fingerprinting technique proposed in [Pfitzmann and Schunter, 1996], in principle the 
fingerprinted copy is known by the buyer only. If the merchant finds an illegal copy, 
he can identify and prove whose copy it was. An advanced technique based on 
[Pfitzmann and Schunter, 1996] is anonymous fingerprinting [Pfitzmann and 
Schunter, 1997], where the buyers can act anonymously, but can still be identified if 
they redistribute the information illegally. Recently, an anonymous fingerprinting 
scheme with automatic identification of redistributors [Domingo, 1998] was proposed 
with the advantage that the merchants need no help from a registration authority to 
identify the dishonest buyer.
All these schemes are based on a secure two-party computation and work on an 
assumption that both parties execute the scheme honestly. When there is no deception, 
these schemes output the fingerprinted copy to the buyer. However, they do not 
achieve the requirement that the fingerprinted copy must not be seen by the merchant. 
When an illegal copy is found, the schemes assume one of the buyers must be 
responsible for it and hence they protect the merchants from cheating by buyers. 
However, they give no protection to buyers from cheating by merchants. Although the 
merchants cannot create the fingerprinted copy in isolation, there are ways for them to 
obtain such a copy. This is because they have access to a non-encrypted copy. The 
possibility of this kind of fraud still remains, even if the secure two-party computation 
is performed at some other place, e.g. a trusted host.
In this chapter, two different approaches are proposed to ensure that the above fraud 
cannot occur. The first approach is based on the idea that the output from the 
fingerprinting scheme should be in encrypted form. A fingerprinting scheme is 
proposed which incorporates public keys. One advantage of this is that certain choices 
of public key schemes (for example RSA) also provide a digital signature scheme by 
using the secret key to sign the message and the public key to verify the signature. The 
secure two-party computational protocol will still be used in the proposed scheme to
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perform the watermarking and encrypting process, after which only the encrypted 
version of the copyright data will be output to the customer.
The second approach is based on the technique of watermarking encrypted video. 
Using this technique, the original copy will be encrypted by the original owner and 
kept in encrypted form with the merchant. The merchant performs the watermark 
process and distributes the watermarked copy to the buyer. Then the original owner 
will send the decryption key directly to the buyer. A scheme which applies this 
technique is described and has the advantage of not needing to assume the honest 
application of a protocol. In other words, the need for a secure two-party computation 
protocol in the fingerprinting schemes can be avoided. The scheme incorporates 
public keys for which the RSA algorithm may be used. These two schemes are such 
that, if an illegal copy is found, the source can be identified without doubt. Also, the 
proposed two schemes have already been published and can be found in [Amomraksa 
et al, 1999a] and [Amomraksa et al, 1999c] respectively.
5.2. Fingerprinting Scheme
The fingerprinting scheme consists of two protocols, namely the protocol for 
registering and for the fingerprinting process. At the beginning, it is assumed that each 
party involved in the scheme already has a key pair (SkB, PkB) of the RSA algorithm, 
so that the public key can serve as an encryption key and a digital identity at the same 
time. A buyer is first required to sign something (in the registering process) under his 
identity with the third party called ‘registration authority’ before the transaction 
between the buyer and the merchant begins. This allows the protocol of the 
fingerprinting process to proceed during the transaction without concern for how the 
validity of the initial digital identity is verified. However, the registration authority is 
introduced to achieve the registering process and not required to be particularly trusted 
by any other party. Hence, there are three parties involved in the proposed scheme: 
merchants, buyers and registration authority, and the details of the registering and 
fingerprinting processes are described as follows:
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Protocol for registering process
i. The buyer B encrypts his identity (2?,-), public key (PkB) and signature (SkB[hB. ])
by using the public key of the registration authority R (PkR) and sends PkR (Bit PkB, 
SkB[hB ]) to R, where hB. is the hash value of Bt derived from a one-way hash
function such as MD5. The buyer’s identity may contain some verifiable data to 
protect against impersonation fraud e.g. credit card number.
ii. R verifies B’s signature by applying PkB to SkB[hB ] and comparing with h[Bi],
then checks his identity with some trusted party e.g. a bank. If everything is correct, 
R records the information and acknowledges the registration by signing PkB with 
his secret key (Skf) and sends back PkB (SkB[PkB]) to B.
iii.B authenticates the acknowledgement from R’s signature. B now uses his public 
key (PkB) and R’s signature (SkR[PkB]) every time he contacts the merchant. 
SkR[PkB] is used as a certificate cert to prove that B’s public key is valid. PkB can 
be considered as a pseudonym used in the anonymous fingerprinting scheme, and B 
can register several times so he may have different pseudonyms.
Protocol for fingerprinting process
i. B sends PkM (Text, PkB, SkB[PkR], cert, Ri) to the merchant M, where Text is a 
string identifying the purchase and Ri is R ’s identity.
ii. M decrypts B’s request by using his secret key (SkM) and finds PkR that corresponds 
to Ri. Then he checks the validity of the public key by verifying cert (SkB[PkB]) 
with PkR and PkB. If it is true, M authenticates the key pair by verifying B’s 
signature by applying PkB to SkB[PkR] and comparing with PkR.
iii.B and M enter a secure two-party computing protocol [Chaum et al, 1988]. B’s 
inputs are PkM, SkB[hj] and cert, where hT is the hash value of Text. M’s inputs are 
PkB, SkMfcert], Text and item, where item is the original copy to be fingerprinted. 
(See Figure 5.1.) The protocol performs computations in order as follows:
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a) The protocol authenticates M’s input by verifying M’s signature (SkMfcert]) 
with B’s inputs PkM and cert and then authenticates B’s input by verifying B’s 
signature {SkB[hT]) with M’s inputs PkB and Text. If one of the results is false, 
the protocol stops and informs B and M. If both results are true, the protocol 
continues.
b) A classical watermarking algorithm [Boneh and Shaw, 1995] is used to embed 
the fingerprint information {emb) into the original copy {item), where emb : = 
Text\ SkB[hTft\ PkB\\ cert. (The symbol W means concatenation).
c) The fingerprinted copy is encrypted with B’s public key (PkB).
PkM, Skulkr], cert Secure two-party 
com puting protocol
P ks  , SkM lcert], Text, item
P ks (item  +  em b)
B
Figure 5.1 Secure Two-party Computing Protocol
The encrypted fingerprinted copy is obtained as output from the protocol and 
sent to B. Note that the scheme given in section 5 of [Pfitzmann and Schunter, 
1995] allows the embedding and extraction of relatively large amounts of 
information. Also, an error correcting code can be used to ensure that the 
embedded information is recovered without any error.
If M finds an illegal copy, he extracts emb from that copy and verifies the buyer’s 
signature (SkB[hT]) by using PkB. This process is for proving that the owner of this 
public key received the original fingerprinted copy and he made an illegal copy. Then 
the merchant sends this proof to R and asks for the identity of this person. With cert 
{SkR[PkB]) in emb, R must know B’s identity.
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5.3. Watermarking Encrypted Video
In this section, the principle of video coding is first described. The video signal under 
consideration is assumed to have been compressed using block-based video coding 
techniques, which apply some sort of transform coding such as the Discrete Cosine 
Transform (DCT). MPEG-2 (Moving Picture Expert Group) is an industrial standard 
for video processing and chosen for use in the experiments. The idea of selective 
encryption is introduced and applied to the coded video signal. Then, the technique for 
watermarking the video sequence is described. Finally, based on the two techniques 
above, the technique of watermarking the encrypted video is presented and its 
efficiency is illustrated by the experimental results.
5.3.1. Principle of MPEG-2 Video Coding
A video sequence consists of a string of time-indexed frames. Each frame is a still- 
colour image of a scene taken at a particular instant in time. The MPEG-2 encoder 
takes a colour video sequence, compresses that sequence using a combination of 
compression schemes, and produces a serial bit stream that can be sent over a 
communication network. At the other end, the MPEG-2 decoder receives this bit 
stream and decodes it to reproduce a facsimile of the original video sequence.
In MPEG-2 encoding, the video sequence is compressed frame-by-frame using block- 
based motion compensation, to take advantage of interframe temporal redundancy, 
and DCT-based compression, to take advantage of intraframe spatial redundancy 
[Mitchell et al, 1997]. Each frame in the sequence is broken into 8x8 pixel blocks for 
intraframe DCT compression and 16x16 pixel macroblocks for interframe motion 
compensation. A 16x16 macroblock also includes two 8x8 chrominance blocks in 
addition to four luminance blocks for a total of six blocks per macroblock.
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A number of these blocks strung together form a slice (of a frame) that acts as a 
resynchronisation unit. One frame may contain only one slice or more, depending on 
its size. These slices combine to form a picture.
A number of these pictures are grouped together to form a random access unit so that 
the video can be viewed either forwards or backwards. This group of pictures (GOP) 
has little or no dependence on the pictures in adjacent GOPs. A GOP consists of three 
types of frames: intracoded frames (I), motion-estimated forward predicted frames (P) 
and motion-estimated bi-directional predicted frames (B) whose frame dependency is 
shown in Figure 5.2.
Prediction Prediction
B B B
VJKAA/ V
Interpolation Interpolation
Figure 5.2 Dependency o f Three Types o f Frames in MPEG-2
I-frames are encoded block by block, without regard to previous or future frames. The 
encoder calculates the DCT of each 8x8 block, transforming that block into its 
frequency-based representation, and then applies the processes of thresholding, 
quantization, zig-zag-scan, run-level-coding (RLC) and Huffman coding, (see Figure 
5.3). Note that, after the quantization step, the DC coefficient is coded separately by a 
predictive Differential Pulse Code Modulation (DPCM) technique while the AC 
coefficients are coded using the run-level symbol structure and referring to the 
Variable Length Code (VLC) tables defined in MPEG-2.
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Figure 5.3 Encoding Processed in MPEG-2
Forward predicted (P) frames are encoded with reference to the most recent previous I 
or P-frame. Each macroblock undergoes a motion-estimation search to find the so- 
called best-fit vector relative to a macroblock from the reference frame. This vector is 
then transmitted along with the error between the macroblocks from the two frames, 
encoded using the DCT. Macroblocks with no motion and no error are marked as 
skipped blocks, and no further coding is performed. The MPEG-2 standard allows 
encoders to include I-blocks in the P-frames. Encoders can choose to encode certain 
blocks as I-blocks when the block cannot be adequately motion-compensated.
Bi-directional predicted (B) frames are coded with reference to both the previous and 
next I or P-frames. The motion-estimation and encoding procedure for B-frames is 
similar to that for P-frames.
The sequence of I, P and B-frames defines what is called the frame pattern of a GOP. 
The GOP always begins with an I-frame and the frame pattern length is the number of 
P and B-frames until the next I-frame. A GOP that ends with a P-frame has no 
encoding dependence on the frames in the next GOP. However, if a GOP ends in a B-
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frame, then the encoding of that B-frame requires access to the first frame of the next 
GOP in the sequence. Figure 5.4 and 5.5 illustrate the schematic diagram of MPEG-2 
encoder and decoder respectively.
£ >
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input
MPEG-2
output
Motion vectors
Modes
DCT VLC
D C T 1
Buffer
Memory + 
predictor
Bit-rate
regulation
Motion
estimator
Picture
re-ordering
MUX
Figure 5.4 Schematic diagram o f MPEG-2 Encoder
D C T 1Buffer
Picture
re-ordering
Memory + 
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input
Quantization step
Motion vectors
Modes
Decoded
video
Figure 5.5 Schematic diagram o f MPEG-2 Decoder
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5.3.2. Selective Encryption
From the MPEG-2 structure as previously described, it can be seen that there is no 
need for the whole video stream to be encrypted. For instance, we could encrypt only 
small important parts of the video stream such as I-frames. When such encrypted 
video is decoded without decrypting first, the coding error will propagate to P and B- 
frames so these frames too will be in corrupted form. Based on this idea, a selective 
encryption scheme [Agi et al, 1996] was proposed with the aim of reducing the 
computation required in the encrypting process. The experimental results of decoding 
images without decrypting, with I-frame and I-block in P and B-frame encrypted, are 
quite satisfactory, although they sometimes reveal a certain amount of information 
such as the general content in the images. This technique may not be suitable for 
secure-purpose applications but it is secure enough in some multimedia applications 
such as video-on-demand where the requirement is to destroy the commercial value of 
the source material.
As already mentioned, this selective method can significantly reduce the amount of 
encryption and decryption. The percentage of reduction depends on many factors such 
as the frequency of I-frames, the particular encoder used, and the actual video 
sequence. In a typical frame sequence of length 10, the 1-frames and I-blocks can take 
from 30 to 60% of the bit stream, depending on the amount of motion in the scene and 
the type of encoder.
In the proposed technique for watermarking encrypted video, the encryption method 
used to encrypt the video is also based on the idea of selective encryption. However, 
the encryption is applied to all the DC coefficients (after the quantization step) only, 
leaving all the AC coefficients unchanged in the watermarking process (described in 
the following sections). Experiments were carried out to show its effectiveness and the 
quality of the encrypted images which were decoded without decrypting. Three 
different types of video sequence, ‘Miss America', ‘Flower' and ‘Bus', were chosen to 
be selectively encrypted at the DC coefficients. The amount of work which is done in 
the encryption process of each sequence are 1.01, 1.53 and 2.46 % compared to their
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original sizes respectively, and the quality of the encrypted images of ‘Flower 
sequence are illustrated in Figure 5.6.
(c) ^  ‘ (d)
Figure 5.6 Encryption o f  DC coefficients in ’F lower’ sequence: (a) original I-frame 
(b) encrypted 1-frame (c) encrypted P-frame (d) encrypted B-frame
5.3.3. W atermarking Technique for Video Sequence
Since a public key cryptosystem such as the RSA algorithm does not completely solve 
the problem of unauthorised copying, the idea of using an indelible watermark to 
identify uniquely both the source of a video sequence and an intended recipient has 
been used instead. Generally, the watermarking techniques should satisfy the 
following requirements to be accepted as useful [Hartung and Girod, 1996].
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• Imperceptibility. The digital watermark embedded into the images should be 
invisible or at least hardly perceptible. In other words, the images must not be 
visibly degraded by the presence of the watermark.
• Security and reliability. The watermark must be strongly resistant to unauthorised 
detection and decoding. That is, without knowledge of the exact parameters, 
unauthorised removal of the watermark must be impossible, even if the basic 
scheme of watermark embedding is known. The watermark must also be capable of 
identifying the source and intended recipient with a low probability of error. 
Innovative error-control coding and digital signature techniques are required to 
ensure reliable and secure communication of the mark as well as authentication of the 
encoded message.
• Robustness. The watermark should be such that it cannot be manipulated by 
intentional or unintentional operations on the bit stream or on the decoded video 
without, at the same time, degrading the perceived quality of the video to the point 
of significantly reducing its commercial value. Such operations are for example 
filtering, cropping, encoding, analog recording and playback, and others.
• Complexity. Watermarking, in the envisaged applications, is an asymmetric 
operation. Watermark embedding is performed on a large number of distributed 
video sequences while watermark retrieval occurs only in cases where possible 
copyright violations have to be investigated. While the retrieval operation may be 
quite complex in order to account for all possible kinds of attacks on the 
watermark, watermark embedding should be of low complexity.
Note that the basics of watermarking for video sequences is the same as for images. 
One technique that can be used for watermarking the video sequence was proposed by 
[Hartung and Girod, 1996]. Basically, the watermark signal is embedded by the 
addition to the video stream of a pseudo-random signal, which is below the threshold 
of perception and cannot be removed without knowledge of the parameters of the 
watermarking algorithm. This method is an extension of ideas from direct-sequence
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spread spectrum communications. The watermark signal is obtained by spreading the 
information bits over many frequency bins, so that the signal energy present in any 
single frequency bin is very small and almost certainly undetectable, and modulating 
them with a binary pseudo-noise sequence.
According to [Hartung and Girod, 1996], a sequence of information bits mjE {-1, 1} to 
be hidden is first spread by a large factor cr, called the chip-rate, to obtain the spread 
sequence bf.
bi = nij, j.cr < i < (j+l).cr (5.1)
This spread sequence bi is then modulated with a pseudo-noise sequence piE {-1, 1} to 
obtain the watermark signal pi.bi. The watermark signal may be amplified with an 
amplitude factor a, subject to consideration of the human visual system (HVS), before 
finally adding it to the pixels of the line-scanned video sequence s,- to obtain the 
watermarked video signal
s ’i = Si + a.pi.bi = Si + Wi (5.2)
Due to the noisy nature of pu w,- is also a noise-like signal and thus difficult to detect, 
locate and manipulate. The recovery of the embedded watermark signal can be 
accomplished by correlating the watermarked video signal with the same pseudo-noise 
sequence pt that was used in the process of constructing the watermark signal. 
Correlation here is demodulation followed by summation over the width of the chip- 
rate. The summation over the correlation window i.e. cr is as follows
0 '+ l).cr-l ( j + l ) . c r - l  ( j + l ) . c r - l
rj =  E  E  P2r a i i (5 3 )
i = j . c r  i = j . c r  i = j . c r
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The first term on the right-hand side of (5.3) vanishes if pi and Si are uncorrelated and
EO + i).cr1 _  q jjowever, we account for a different number of - l ’s and l ’s in thei = j . c r  i
interval \j.cr....(j+l).cr] of the pseudo-noise sequence by including the term
( j + l ) . c r -1
A = ( X  p,).(? ,), (5.4)
i —j - c r
Then rj ideally becomes
(j+l).cr-l
Tj = ^  Pi'S*t -  A ~ cr.a.mj (5.5)
i - j - c r
If the peak of the correlation is positive (or, respectively, negative), the recovered 
information bit is a +1 (or -1), that is, the recovered information bit m ) = sign (rj). To 
increase the number of bits in the information signal, the chip-rate (cr) of St should be 
small. However, the chip-rate depends on a trade-off between the amount of added 
information bits and the likelihood of error in the decoding process. To reduce this 
likelihood of error, an error correcting code can be applied to the information bits 
before the spreading process.
In most video applications such as video-on-demand, the video signal will usually be 
stored in compressed format such as MPEG-2. Therefore, to watermark the coded 
video, the video signal will be decoded first, watermarked and then re-encoded again. 
This is a time-consuming operation since the encoding process is much more 
complicated than the decoding process. However, the watermarking technique just 
described above can be applied to the video signal in a compressed format (i.e. 
MPEG-2) without decoding and re-encoding [Hartung and Girod, 1997].
To watermark the coded video signal, the watermark signal just described is 
transformed using the DCT and added coefficient-by-coefficient to the coded video. 
The DC coefficient will be added directly while each VLC codeword for the coded 
video must be decoded first in order that each non-zero AC coefficient can be added
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to the corresponding AC coefficient of the watermark signal. The bit-rate of the 
watermarked video signal can be controlled as follows. If the resultant VLC codeword 
has more bits than the original (before watermark), then the original will be output 
instead. Thus the bit-rate of the video stream is not increased. Figure 5.7 illustrates the 
quality of the watermarked images of ‘Bus’ sequence with different values of cr.
Figure 5.7 First (I-) fram e o f ’B us’ sequence: (a) original fram e (b) cr = 10 
(c) cr = 100 (d) cr = 1000 (e) cr = 10000 (f) cr = 100000
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5.3.4. Technique for Watermarking Encrypted Video
To watermark the encrypted video, the encryption is first applied selectively to all the 
DC coefficients of the video signal. Then, a simple scheme for the watermarking of 
MPEG-2 video, based on the watermarking techniques previously described, is 
applied to all the AC coefficients of the video signal. That is, the watermark signal is 
transformed using the DCT and added coefficient-by-coefficient (except the DC 
coefficient) to the coded video. This leaves the encrypted DC coefficient unchanged.
In [Hartung and Girod, 1998], it is shown that typically around 15-30 % of the DCT 
coefficients are altered, depending on scene structure and bit-rate, although the DC 
coefficient will not be watermarked. The authors indicated that should there be 
insufficient DCT coefficients to recover the watermark signal, it may be possible to 
compensate by increasing the chip-rate (although this results in a decrease in the data 
rate for the watermark). The experiments based on the proposed technique were 
carried out and the results are shown in Figures 5.8 and 5.9.
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(c)
Figure 5.8 First (I-) fram e o f ’Miss A m erica’ sequence: (a) original fram e  
(b) encryption o f  DC coefficients (c) watermark signal is embedded in 
AC  coefficients (d) watermarked fram e after decrypting
Chapter 5 Secure Distribution o f  Copyright Data
(a) (b)
Figure 5.9 (a) A  P-frame and (b) a B-frame from  ’Miss Am erica’ sequence 
after encryption o f  DC coefficients and propagation  
o f coding errors from  other fram es
5.4. Implementation and Fingerprinting Scheme
The general model of the scheme is that a set of individual copies of the DC 
coefficients of the original video is sent to the merchants, each copy encrypted with a 
unique encryption key Ki, and each having a corresponding serial number. Before the 
encrypting process, the original owner will embed in each copy a fingerprint to allow 
later identification both of the merchant and of that particular copy (in the manner of 
[Wu, 1997]). A single copy of the remainder (unencrypted part) of the video is also 
sent to each of the merchants who are in different locations e.g. other countries. (See 
step 1 of Figure 5.10.) In the experiments, the number of the DC coefficients turns out 
to be only around 1-2% of the whole video. So each merchant needs to store only the 
(small) individually encrypted copies of the DC coefficients and one copy of the rest 
of the video. The fingerprinting scheme which is proposed for implementation of the 
watermarking process above draws highly on the use of public keys. Also, in this 
scheme, each party is assumed to have a key pair (Pk and Sk) under the RSA 
algorithm.
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After a registering process (the same protocol as presented in section 5.2), when a 
customer requests to buy/watch the video (step 2), the merchant sends the original 
owner an authenticated message, secured by the owner’s public key, containing the 
request information (step 3). The owner then sends the corresponding decryption key 
encrypted by the customer’s public key directly to the customer (step 4). The merchant 
then makes another copy of the non-encrypted part of the video and embeds a unique 
watermark (i.e. a fingerprint) into it. This is combined with one of the individually 
encrypted copies of the DC coefficient and the resultant encrypted and fingerprinted 
copy of the video is sent to the customer (step 5).
Original Owner
Local Distributor 
(Merchant)
Customer
(Buyer)
(1 ) E Ki(DC) (ie l )  
and rem a in d e r
(2) Pk,M ( r e q u e s t) (5) E ki ( item ) +  em b
(3) P k o  (req u e s t)
Figure 5.10 General Model o f Fingerprinting Scheme
In practice, there will be an additional body, namely a trusted party, who the original 
owner will allow to manage the key distribution for the customers. The details of the 
fingerprinting process are as follows.
Protocol for fingerprinting process
i. B sends PkM (Text, Pks, SkB[hR], cert, Ri) to the merchant M, where Text is a string 
identifying the purchase, hr is the hash value of Text and Rt is R’s identity.
ii. M decrypts B’s request by using his secret key (SkM) and finds PkR that corresponds 
to Ri. Then he checks the validity of the public key by verifying cert (SkR[PkB]) 
with PkR and PkR. Also, M authenticates the key pair by verifying B’s signature by 
applying PkB to SkB[hR] and comparing with hT. If both results are true, M sends
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Pko (serial number, Text, PkB, SkB[hr], SkM[PkB], M) to the original owner O, 
where SkM[PkB] acts as a certificate issued by M to guarantee B.
iii. O decrypts M’s request by using his secret key (Sk0) and finds PkM that 
corresponds to M. Then he checks the validity of the public key by verifying M’s 
signature (SkM[PkBJ) with PkM and PkB. He also authenticates B’s request by 
verifying B’s signature in the same manner as did M. If both results are true, O 
sends back a secured acknowledgement PkM (Skolserial number], O) to M and the 
secured decryption key PkB (Ki) to B.
iv. When M has all parameters as previously described, he uses the proposed 
watermarking technique to embed a fingerprint emb into E^item ). He thus forms 
the final version of the whole video and then sends this copy to B.
5.5. Security Analysis
Since M puts the fingerprint information into the request to O, O can log, for each 
purchase, the fingerprint identifying the merchant and the particular copy, the 
fingerprint identifying the buyer and purchase, the merchant, the buyer and the 
decryption key issued. M is blamed if O receives more than one request for the same 
decryption key or if a pirate copy turns up which bears invalid (or no) fingerprints. (In 
the latter case M’s fingerprint in the DC coefficient of that copy would identify M as 
the culprit.) Otherwise any pirate copy has a correct fingerprint corresponding to some 
buyer B who is thus responsible.
According to the scheme, M uses PkR and the signature issued by R to prove the 
validity of B before sending him the fingerprinted encrypted copy of the video, whilst 
O uses PkM and the signature issued by M to prove the validity of the transaction 
between M and B before sending the decryption key to B. Therefore, it can be 
considered that the security of the whole system relies on the difficulty of breaking the 
public key algorithm. That is, if the secret key of any party can be derived, that party’s 
signature can be forged. For the problem of public key authentication, for instance, B 
and M can obtain PkR in several ways such as they can get it directly from R or from a
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public key database. If it is necessary for R’s public key to be taken from a database 
then all public keys must be signed by some trusted party known to B and M.
The security of the scheme clearly also depends on the watermarking technique used 
being robust. That is, the information in the watermarks should not be affected by 
attacks which do not significantly impair the quality of the video. The potential 
attacker is the merchant in the case of the watermark applied to the DC coefficient and 
the buyer in the case of the watermark applied to the remainder of the video (AC 
coefficients). The debate on the robustness of the various watermarking techniques is 
ongoing with existing techniques being refined to meet previously unconsidered 
attacks [Hartung et al, 1999]. The technique that has been used for watermarking the 
AC coefficients in the proposed scheme is certainly believed to be robust to current 
known attacks when applied to the entire video [Hartung and Girod, 1998]. The same 
technique could be used for the watermark for the DC coefficient since the robustness 
of such a watermark has been argued for by previous authors who have also suggested 
selective watermarking [Wu, 1997].
5.6. Conclusions
This chapter has addressed the weakness of distributing copyright data in existing 
schemes, where those schemes give no protection to buyers from cheating by 
merchants. Two different approaches have been proposed to ensure that any fraud can 
be detected and the cheater can be identified without doubt. In the first approach, a 
fingerprinting scheme which incorporates the RSA algorithm has been proposed, 
while the secure two-party computational protocol will still be required to perform the 
watermarking and encrypting process but its output will be in the encrypted form.
In the second approach, a technique of watermarking encrypted video where a DCT is 
performed has been proposed. It is based on the idea of encrypting the DC coefficient 
and watermarking the AC coefficients. The experimental results have shown that the
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encrypted images are sufficiently degraded for general applications such as video 
distribution over Internet or video-on-demand.
A scheme for implementing the proposed technique, which gives secure distribution 
of copyright compressed video stream data, has also been presented. The scheme 
allows the encrypted video to be sent to merchants in different locations prior to 
fingerprinting. The encrypted copy of the video is of no use to the merchant since he 
does not have the decryption key. Thus there is protection from a dishonest merchant 
who tries to deceive other parties in the system. Another advantage of the scheme is 
that it does not need a secure two-party computing protocol and hence means there is a 
reduction in complexity compared to the existing schemes. Furthermore, the scheme 
can also be applied to some programmed broadcast applications such as pay-per-view 
by distributing the decryption keys to the customers before the broadcasting begins.
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6.1. Conclusions
The major contributions of this thesis are the development of several new schemes for 
data security purposes in communication systems. Each scheme has been designed to 
resolve specific requirements of some particular applications in communication 
scenarios, especially in multimedia communications. A range of issues which have been 
considered can be classified as follows:
Data integrity: the problem of how to certify the integrity of images from digital 
cameras such as video surveillance has been addressed. A scheme which applies public 
key algorithms and a time-stamping technique has been proposed to assure that the 
manipulation of digital images cannot occur so that the recorded data can be regarded 
as evidence and then used as proof in a court of law. From security analysis, it is 
shown that the scheme can protect against an attempt by any party to falsify evidence, 
even if there is collaboration between two parties.
User authentication: the weakness of using the smart card and set top box combination 
technique to authenticate the authorised users in one-way broadcast applications such as 
pay-TV services has been indicated. A key distribution scheme has been proposed to 
ensure that such a weakness can be overcome. The scheme uses conventional 
encryption algorithms along with the CRT (Chinese Remainder Theorem) to validate
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the combination of a smart card and a set top box for user authentication purposes. 
Moreover, the proposed scheme can protect against illegal smart cards (copying or 
cloning) and can be implemented with the existing access control units i.e. smart card 
controlled set top boxes.
Privacy: the right of privacy in communications between two parties has been 
discussed. A situation in which the parties may be coerced to reveal the decryption 
key, thereby disclosing their conversations, has been considered. An encryption 
scheme based on cascading algorithms has been introduced for the purpose of hiding 
ciphertext so that the hidden message can still be kept secret. The scheme involves 
two block algorithms, that is a standard algorithm and a private algorithm which are 
cascaded. The standard algorithm can be any encryption algorithm which is widely 
accepted to be secure, such as DES. The CRT is applied in a private algorithm which 
is used to construct the final ciphertext. This ciphertext is such that there are two 
possible decryptions, each with a different key. With the proposed scheme, the 
attacker will not be able to find any evidence from his intercepted ciphertext with 
which to accuse the parties.
Complexity: the problem of encrypting large amounts of data, especially by using the 
asymmetric algorithms, has been considered. A low-complexity encryption method 
using block ciphers has been proposed to cope with that kind of data, for example, a 
compressed video stream. Discrete linear transforms, such as the DCT, were 
implemented in the encryption scheme to reduce the amount of work needed to be 
done in the encryption/decryption process. The block size of the transformation can be 
varied which results in a computational reduction rate of 1 In, where n is the maximum 
number of samples in the transformation block. From the given example, the amount 
of work for encrypting/decrypting a file was reduced by 98.4375 % compared to a 
conventional encryption method. The security of the whole system mainly relies on the 
block ciphers used in the scheme, which can be either symmetrical or asymmetrical 
algorithms.
Copyrighted data distribution: the problem of secure distribution of copyright data has 
been addressed. Since watermark techniques alone cannot solve the above problem,
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cryptographic algorithms were then combined with the watermarking techniques to 
achieve the purpose of secure distribution of copyright data. Two different approaches 
have been presented.
The first approach is based on the idea that the output from the watermarking scheme 
should be in encrypted form, and a scheme which incorporates the RSA algorithm has 
been proposed. Principally, the scheme still uses the secure two-party computational 
protocol to perform the watermarking and encrypting process, but the protocol will 
output only the encrypted version of the copyright data to the customer.
The second approach is based on the idea of watermarking encrypted video. A 
technique for watermarking encrypted video which has been encoded using block- 
based video coding techniques e.g. MPEG-2 has been described. By dividing the 8x8 
DCT coefficients of the coded video into DC and AC coefficient parts, the encrypting 
process is applied first but only to the DC coefficient so that the watermarking process 
can be applied later to the AC coefficients. Although the video signal is not entirely 
encrypted, in some video applications such as broadcasting services, the quality of this 
selectively encrypted video is considered to be sufficiently degraded. The technique 
enables the original copy to be kept in encrypted form with local distributors who sell 
watermarked encrypted copies while the original owner distributes the decryption 
keys. After the decrypting and decoding process, the video signal still contains the 
watermark inside. A scheme which applies this technique has also been described.
6.2. Future Work
The applications which involve data security have been widely used in communication 
networks, for example through use of PGP (Pretty Good Privacy). The subjects related 
to security become more important and essential in communication systems design. 
Researchers around the world still keep proposing new cryptographic algorithms and 
techniques to solve some particular security-related problems which come with both 
the existing applications and the up-coming ones in the future. This thesis addressed
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varied data security problems found in existing applications and proposed the 
solutions for those problems. However, for future work, there are still many problems 
in security remaining to be considered in every application being used nowadays, 
including the ones discussed in the thesis. Furthermore, the cryptographic algorithms 
used in the proposed schemes or the schemes themselves can be improved and 
developed to gain more benefits either in security or other aspects.
One example is that, according to the technique of watermarking encrypted video, the 
watermarked parts (i.e. AC coefficients) are a very large proportion of the whole video 
and differ between customers. This makes the bandwidth required for the broadcasting 
channel too large to be implemented in practice. However, we cannot discount the 
possibility of the future discovery of an efficient watermarking technique which fulfils 
all necessary requirements but requires only a small amount of the information to be 
watermarked.
Another possibility of future work is based on the idea of dual level access to 
broadcasting networks which is described below.
6.2.1. Dual Level Access to Broadcasting Networks
Consider applications in digital TV broadcasting networks such as pay-TV services. 
Some programmes will be encrypted before transmitting to every subscriber. Only the 
authorised subscribers who pay an extra fee can get access to these programmes. This 
method does not give any value at all to other subscribers who have not paid for that 
particular channel. The allocated bandwidth is used only for broadcasting the 
encrypted signal to the authorised subscribers, which may be a small group compared 
to all subscribers in the network. It will be more efficient if we can devise an encoding 
scheme in which the authorised subscribers can access the encrypted signal and, at the 
same time, the other subscribers can receive something on the same channel such as 
an advertisement. That is, the scheme gives two levels of access to the subscribers in 
the network. However, such a scheme should not extend the existing allocated 
bandwidth.
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To achieve this requirement, watermarking-type techniques based on direct-sequence 
spread spectrum communications could be introduced to add specific information (i.e. 
advertisements) to the access-limited signal, which is protected by encryption 
techniques. With this technique, the allocated bandwidth for broadcasting is utilised 
more efficiently, and more benefit is given to both the service providers (through 
advertising) and all subscribers in the network (since there will be programmes which 
they are not authorised to access but can see advertised).
According to the watermarking technique described in section 5.3.3, the extra 
information can be added directly into the transmitted signal which is in encrypted 
form, where a  is set to 1 and st is the transmitted signal. Given a key to reproduce the 
same pseudo-random binary sequence (PRBS) at the receiver’s side, this extra 
information can be recovered. Then the encrypted signal can be recovered by 
subtracting the information signal from the transmitted signal. The operation of the 
encoding scheme is shown in Figure 6.1. (The information signal can be added to the 
encrypted signal either before or after the channel coding process.)
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Figure 6.1 The Operation o f the Encoding Scheme
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The implementation of the above technique is given as follows. If the bit-rate of the 
encrypted signal is 3Mb/s, cr = 100, k = 2 and the code rate for error correcting code =
0.5, the rate at which information bits can be added is 7.5kb/s. (after the channel 
coding process). With this bit-rate, an image signal in compression form can be 
transmitted every 15s. Therefore, we can transmit a total bit-rate of 3.0075Mb/s within 
the existing bandwidth allocation of 3Mb/s.
It is obvious that the encoding scheme just described gains a lot of benefit for existing 
broadcast applications. However, at the present, this technique is impractical since the 
encrypted signal sometimes cannot be recovered. A technical problem occurs in the 
demodulation process when the summation over the width of the chip-rate gives the 
wrong sign of decoded information bit. This problem still remains even if the 
correction term A, according to equation (5.4), has been added before the summation 
step. In watermarking applications, where the original copy has no need to be 
recovered from the watermarked copy, this problem can then be ignored.
It can be clearly seen that what the future work on this topic will be. At first glance, it 
may not look possible to achieve the decoding techniques, when embedding the extra 
information in a reversible way into the transmitted signal. Nevertheless, as mentioned 
earlier, we cannot discount the possibility of the future discovery of an efficient 
decoding technique which fulfils the above requirement. This is therefore a challenge 
for the future work.
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